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I. Introduction 
A. The Thesis of Converging Legal Orders 
Globalization causes convergence of legal orders. Or so it is argued. 
Law and economics scholars predict that legal orders will move towards 
the same efficient end state. They argue that the requirements of global-
ization will pressure legal orders to converge on the level of economic 
efficiency, because regulatory competition between legal orders makes it 
impossible for individual legal systems to maintain suboptimal solu-
tions.1 Many comparative lawyers predict a similar convergence. In 
particular traditional functionalist comparatists have long held that unifi-
cation of law was both desirable and unavoidable.2 Their basic argument 
is based on functional equivalence and can be summarized as follows: 
legal systems may look different because they have different doctrines 
and institutions; these differences, however, are only superficial, because 
the institutions fulfill the same functions and are therefore actually simi-
                                                                                                                                 
 1. The debate over this issue is immense. For two overview articles, see Anthony 
Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to 
Comparative Law, 48 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 405 (1999); Ugo A. Mattei, Luisa Antonioli & 
Andrea Rossato, Comparative Law and Economics, in 1 Encyclopedia of Law and Eco-
nomics 505, 508–14 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). The convergence 
debate has been especially vigorous in corporate law; for an overview, see Jennifer G. Hill, 
The Persistent Debate about Convergence in Comparative Corporate Governance, 27 Sydney 
L. Rev. 743 (2005). It is not always clear whether convergence is meant to concern form or 
substance; see Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or 
Function, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 329 (2001).  
 2. For the relationship between similarity and difference in comparative law, see Cath-
erine Valcke, Comparative Law as Comparative Jurisprudence—The Comparability of Legal 
Systems, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 713 (2004); Gerhard Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of 
Similarities or Differences?, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 383 (Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
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lar. Realizing that legal orders are already similar in substance should 
make it easy to unify the law formally as well.3 
Others see legal culture as an obstacle to (or a savior from) such 
convergence.4 Culture is portrayed as a bulwark against the exclusive 
focus on efficiency that many economists advocate.5 Similarly, compara-
tive lawyers invoke cultural difference as a counterweight to the 
similarities that functionalist comparatists emphasize.6 
This suggests that convergence should be difficult where domestic 
culture and values are important, such as in criminal law and family law, 
but easy in areas such as economic law, where domestic values are 
largely similar and transnational contacts put pressure on national legal 
systems. Even if culture underpins economic laws,7 it is difficult to see 
why this culture should be national and why economic globalization 
should not rather create a global culture,8 which in turn should facilitate 
legal convergence and unification. 
B. The Challenge of Persistent Differences  
in International Jurisdiction 
This distinction between value-free transnational areas of law that 
converge, and value-laden local areas of law that do not, is not in accor-
dance with reality. The biggest challenge for the convergence thesis 
comes not from theory but practice: it is not happening. To be sure, we 
see considerable convergence in many areas of the law—accounting 
standards, corporate governance, and capital markets, for instance. 
                                                                                                                                 
 3. E.g., Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law 24 
(Tony Weir trans., 3d ed. 1998); Ugo Mattei, A Transaction Costs Approach to the European 
Civil Code, 5 Eur. Rev. Priv. L. 537 (1997); for discussion, see Ralf Michaels, The Func-
tional Method of Comparative Law, in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law, supra note 
2, at 339, 376–78. 
 4. For the most outspoken version of this view, see Pierre Legrand, European Legal 
Systems Are Not Converging, 45 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 52, 61–62 (1996). 
 5. See Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Fran-
çaise, Les droits de tradition civiliste en question. À propos des Rapports Doing 
Business de la Banque Mondiale 7 (2006), http://www.henricapitant.org/IMG/pdf/ 
Les_droits_de_tradition_civiliste_en_question.pdf. 
 6. See generally Günter Frankenberg, Critical Comparisons: Rethinking Comparative 
Law, 26 Harv. Int’l L.J. 411 (1985); Bernhard Grossfeld, Core Questions of Com-
parative Law (Vivian Grosswald Curran trans., 2005); Pierre Legrand, Le droit comparé 
(1999); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for 
Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 657 (1998); see also Dannemann, supra 
note 2, at 389–91. 
 7. Pierre Legrand, Counterpoint: Law Is Also Culture, in The Unification of In-
ternational Commercial Law 245 (Franco Ferrari ed., 1998). 
 8. See Volkmar Gessner, Global Approaches in the Sociology of Law: Problems and 
Challenges, 22 J.L. Soc’y 85, 90 (1995); Charles Koch, Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 
25 Mich. J. Int’l L. 1 (2003); Russell Menyhart, Changing Identities and Changing Law: 
Possibilities for a Global Legal Culture, 10 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 157 (2003). 
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Nonetheless, we also see areas of economic law that are surprisingly re-
sistant to convergence. This resistance to change represents a serious 
challenge to the convergence thesis and constitutes the focus of this Arti-
cle. 
One area where convergence is not taking place is the law of per-
sonal jurisdiction in international cases. Personal jurisdiction is an area 
in which the strong interdependence between legal systems suggests that 
unification should be desirable or that convergence should occur. More-
over, there is substantive agreement about the values involved: “Most 
legal systems recognize the requirement that the parties and the transac-
tion have some connection with that legal system before an organ of that 
system—paradigmatically a court—can take action.”9 And yet, U.S. and 
European approaches remain remarkably different,10 and mutual under-
standing remains difficult. Europeans are said to fear U.S. courts like 
medieval torture chambers;11 they regularly regard assertions of jurisdic-
tion by U.S. courts as acts of judicial hegemonialism.12 Americans are 
barely less concerned over being dragged into European courts. For ex-
ample, when France asserted jurisdiction over Yahoo! on the mere basis 
that its website was accessible from French computers,13 many Ameri-
cans were outraged. 
                                                                                                                                 
 9. Eugene F. Scoles, Peter Hay, Patrick J. Borchers & Symeon C. Symeonides, 
Conflict of Laws 288 (4th ed. 2004). 
 10. E.g. Arthur T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in 
Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of 
Common- and Civil-Law Systems, 295 Recueil des Cours 9 (2002); Samuel P. 
Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg-
ments 11–73 (2003); Ronald A. Brand, Private Law and Public Regulation in U.S. Courts, 2 
CILE Studies 115 (2005); Alegría Borràs, The 1999 Preliminary Draft Hague Convention on 
Jurisdiction, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments: Agreements and Disagreements, in 
The Hague Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments 41 
(Fausto Pocar & Constanza Honorati eds., 2005). 
 11. Brand, supra note 10, at 116. 
 12. For a selection of authors from different countries, see Julie Allard & Antoine 
Garapon, Les juges dans la mondialisation 36 (2005); Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le 
relatif et l’universel 405 (2004); Nico Krisch, International Law in Times of Hegemony: 
Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 369, 
400–404 (2005); Ugo Mattei & Jeffrey S. Lena, United States Jurisdiction Over Conflicts 
Arising Outside of the US: Some Hegemonic Implications, 1 Global Jurist Topics, No. 2, 
Art. 5 (2001), http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol1/iss2/art5; Willibald Posch, Ambulance 
Chasing im Dienste US-amerikanischer Rechtshegemonie—Wird “forum shopping” durch in 
Österreich tätige Anwälte gesellschaftsfähig? Kritische Anmerkungen zu einem aktuellen 
Vorgang, 42 Zeitschrift für Rechtsvergleichung 14 (2001). For criticism of this view, 
see Ralf Michaels, US-Gerichte als Weltgerichte. Die Avantgarde der Globalisierung, 31 
DAJV-Newsletter 46, 54 (2006). 
 13. See Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.] [court of original jurisdiction] Paris, May 22, 
2000 (Fr.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/tgiparis20000522-asg.htm. 
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Indeed, U.S. and European approaches to jurisdiction are strikingly 
different. Some differences concern specific bases of jurisdiction. Does 
“doing business” create a sufficient connection to the defendant for the 
assertion of jurisdiction? Many Americans still think so,14 while Europe-
ans disagree strongly.15 Can jurisdiction be based on mere service of 
process in the forum state? Again, the answer is yes under American 
law,16 no under European law.17 Is it justified to assert jurisdiction in 
product liability at the place of the injury even if the injurer could not 
possibly have expected the injury to occur there? Here, Europeans gen-
erally see no problems,18 while Americans believe this would violate the 
defendant’s constitutional rights.19 Does the plaintiff’s nationality create 
a sufficiently close relationship to assert jurisdiction over a defendant 
                                                                                                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 442 (1952); Rus-
sell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 216–22 (5th ed. 2006). But 
see Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 
89, 115 (1999) (proposing to abolish doing business jurisdiction in the United States); Stephen 
B. Burbank, All the World His Stage, 52 Am. J. Comp. L. 741, 749–53 (2004) (book review) 
(questioning the viability of this ground of jurisdiction in its traditional form). 
 15. See Rolf A. Schütze, Die Allzuständigkeit amerikanischer Gerichte 14–
15 (2003).  
 16. See Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990); for application to interna-
tional cases, see, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985). But 
see Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 421, n. 5 (1987) (“Jurisdiction 
based on service of process on one only transitorily present in a state is no longer acceptable 
under international law if that is the only basis for jurisdiction and the action in question is 
unrelated to that state.”). 
 17. See Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American 
Cooperation with Those Systems, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 9, 20 (1996). For Americans insisting 
that this basis remain, see Andreas Lowenfeld, Thoughts about a Multinational Judgments 
Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 296 
(1994); Peter D. Trooboff, Proposed Hague Conference General Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments—Some Thoughts on Finding Solutions to 
Tough Issues, in E Pluribus Unum—Liber Amicorum Georges A.L. Droz 461, 463 (Ale-
gría Borrás et al. eds., 1996). Others hoped that abolition of tag jurisdiction in a Hague 
Convention could lead to the elimination of this basis in U.S. jurisdictional law; see Clermont, 
supra note 14, at 115–6; Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century 
or Beginning of the Millennium?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 115–16 (1999). 
 18. Council Regulation 44/2001, Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 4 (EC) [hereinafter 
Brussels I]. The precursor to the Regulation was drafted in 1968 (see 1968 Brussels Conven-
tion on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(consolidated version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 1)); Brussels I is distinct from the Brussels II Regula-
tion, which deals with recognition and enforcement of judgments in family law matters. 
 19. Ronald A. Brand, Tort Jurisdiction in a Multilateral Convention: The Lessons of the 
Due Process Clause and the Brussels Convention, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 125, 153–55 (1998) 
(arguing that language in leading cases by the European Court of Justice could lead to asser-
tion of jurisdiction that would be unconstitutional under U.S. law); see also Ronald A. Brand, 
Due Process, Jurisdiction and a Hague Judgments Convention, 60 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 661, 695 
(1999). 
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with no other connections to that country?20 Is the presence of a piece of 
the defendant’s property, no matter how small, sufficient for the assertion 
of unlimited jurisdiction over the defendant?21 Americans are incredulous 
and deeply critical of these bases, which are still available in European 
jurisdictions against non-European defendants.22 
More general differences concern the style and flexibility of jurisdic-
tional law. American law relies on broad standards of “fairness” and 
“reasonableness” that are applied in each individual case. This enables 
the judge to focus on achieving justice in individual cases even if it ham-
pers predictability for the parties. European law, by contrast, uses hard 
and fast rules that are easier to apply and therefore more predictable but 
may lead to unjust results in individual cases.23 In addition, U.S. law pro-
vides specific doctrines, such as forum non conveniens and antisuit 
injunctions, that give judges discretion to fine-tune and equilibrate24 ju-
risdiction in individual cases. European law is strongly opposed to both 
doctrines, as the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has recently made 
clear.25 Instead, Europeans consider jurisdictional bases non-
discretionary, resolving the problem of parallel proceedings through a lis 
alibi pendens rule that uses a strict formal criterion of which court was 
seized of the matter first.26 
                                                                                                                                 
 20. Code civil [C. civ.] art. 14 (Fr.); see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B. Palmer, Exor-
bitant Jurisdiction, 58 Me. L. Rev. 473, 482–503 (2006). 
 21. See Zivilprozeßordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] Sept. 12, 1950, Bundesge-
setzblatt [BGBI] § 23 (F.R.G.); See also Jurisdiktionsnorm [JN] [Code of Judicial 
Organization] Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBI] 111/1895, § 99(1) (Austria); see von Mehren, supra 
note 10, at 174–77. 
 22. See Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 4. For reasons for the persistence of these bases in 
the Brussels Regulation, see infra text accompanying notes 272–273. As between member 
states, these bases are unavailable. 
 23. Christian Kohler, Practical Experience of the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments 
Convention in the Six Original States, 34 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 563, 582 (1985); von Mehren, 
supra note 10, at 69–72; Trevor C. Hartley, The European Union and the Systematic Disman-
tling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws, 54 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 813, 814 (2005). Note 
that this is not the same as the difference between case law and statutory law. Statutes can be 
very openly worded, as are many states’ long arm statutes that merely invoke the limits of the 
Constitution; precedential rules formulated by courts, by contrast, can be very precise. 
 24. For the terminology, see Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the 
Proposed Hague Convention and Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 205–06 
(2001); von Mehren, supra note 10, at 306. 
 25. Case C-159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. I-3565 (holding antisuit injunctions 
incompatible with the Brussels Regulation); Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-
1383 (holding forum non conveniens incompatible with the Brussels Regulation); for critical 
analyses, see Richard Fentiman, National Law and the European Jurisdiction Regime, in In-
ternational Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States 83 (Arnaud 
Nuyts & Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Hartley, supra note 23. 
 26. Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 27. 
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Still other differences concern sources of law and relevant actors.27 
The U.S. law of jurisdiction has long been constitutionalized, while 
European law remains sub-constitutional.28 In the United States, the most 
important source of rules and principles on jurisdiction is the U.S. Con-
stitution, notably its Due Process Clause.29 In Europe, by contrast, the 
most important source is a subconstitutional legislative instrument, the 
Brussels I Judgment Regulation (Brussels Regulation);30 the basis in na-
tional legal systems is statutory law.31 As a consequence, different actors 
have been primarily involved in the development of jurisdictional rules 
and principles. In the United States, this task has been left almost exclu-
sively to judges.32 In Europe, on the other hand, the task traditionally 
falls mostly to legislators, though the ECJ plays an increasingly impor-
tant role. 
These differences are not only significant, but they are also difficult 
to surmount. This became clear during negotiations at the Hague towards 
a Worldwide Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters. In 
1996, the Hague Conference on Private International Law had accepted a 
proposal by the American delegation to develop such an instrument.33 
Although expectations and ambitions had been grand,34 negotiations soon 
proved difficult.35 Some compromises on individual issues were reached,36 
                                                                                                                                 
 27. See von Mehren, supra note 10, at 72–74. 
 28. But see infra part IV.A for the plaintiff’s quasi-constitutional right to a forum. 
 29. The Full Faith and Credit Clause has not been an important source after the Su-
preme Court decision in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see infra note 144. 
 30. Brussels I, supra note 18.  
 31. This is not true without exception. The right of Swiss domiciliaries to be sued only 
in their home forum enjoyed constitutional protection until 1998 in Bundesverfassung art. 
59(1). See Baumgartner, supra note 10, at 147–49. 
 32. von Mehren, supra note 10, at 95. 
 33. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Final Act of the Eighteenth Ses-
sion, in Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session 29, 47 (1996) (The Hague, 1999). 
 34. Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments Abroad and Foreign 
Judgments in the United States: Would an International Convention Be Useful?, 57 Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht [RabelsZ] 449 
(1993); see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—
A New Approach for the Hague Conference?, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs. 271 (1994); Haimo 
Schack, Perspektiven eines weltweiten Anerkennungs- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommens, 1 
Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht [ZEuP] 306, 317–32 (1993). 
 35. For a detailed account, see David McClean, The Hague Conference’s Judgments 
Project, in Reform and Development of Private International Law—Essays in Hon-
our of Sir Peter North 255 (John Fawcett ed., 2002). 
 36. For examples of compromises, see Arthur T. von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on 
International Jurisdiction and the Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-wide: Can 
the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 191, 195–96 (2001); Ronald A. 
Brand, Current Problems, Common Ground, and First Principles: Restructuring the  
Preliminary Draft Convention Text, in A Global Law of Jurisdiction and Judgments: 
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but a draft convention circulated in 199937 proved so unpopular, espe-
cially with the U.S. delegation,38 that the intended vote on the convention 
in 2000 was postponed. Instead of moving forward with the convention 
as planned, the delegations scaled back the negotiations to a convention 
on choice of court agreements, which was concluded in the summer of 
200539 but has not, as of September 2006, been signed by any member 
state.40 Regardless of whether this convention will be successful,41 it 
represents a serious retreat from the much greater ambitions associated 
with the original project. 
These differences between U.S. and European approaches to juris-
diction and the difficulties facing unification projects present a serious 
challenge to the convergence thesis. Traditional explanations for the in-
tractability of the differences seem insufficient. In theory, the differences 
could be attributed to a lack of interdependence and communication. But 
there has been ample exposure, debate, and good will, both during nego-
tiations in the Hague and amongst scholars in general, and still no 
substantial agreement has emerged. Differences could also arise from 
divergent goals. Indeed, to some extent private litigation has a stronger 
regulatory nature in the United States than it does in Europe.42 Yet by and 
                                                                                                                      
Lessons from the Hague Convention 75 (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 
2002). 
 37. Hague Conference on Private International Law—Enforcement of Judgments, Pre-
liminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters adopted by the Special Commission and Report by Peter Nygh and Fausto Pocar, 
Prelim. Doc. No. 11 (August 2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/ 
jdgmpd11.pdf. 
 38. See Letter from Jeffrey Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private Int’l Law, U.S. 
Dept. of State, to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l Law (Feb. 
22, 2000), 25 DAJV-Newsletter 44 (2000); available at http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/ 
list/intpil/doc00003.doc; von Mehren, supra note 36, at 194–196.  
 39. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention], 44 I.L.M. 1294 (2005). 
 40. Status Table of the Hague Convention, available at http://www.hcch.net/ 
index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98. 
 41. For positive views, see Ronald A. Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements, Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Insights, July 26, 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/ 
2005/07/insights050726.html; Giesela Rühl, Das Haager Übereinkommen über die Vereinba-
rung gerichtlicher Zuständigkeiten: Rückschritt oder Fortschritt? 25 Praxis des 
Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) 410 (2005); Louise Ellen Teitz, 
The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy and Providing an Alter-
native to Arbitration, 53 Am. J. Comp. L. 543 (2005). For some doubts, see Christian 
Thiele, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements—Was it Worth the Effort? in 
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World: Essays in Memory of Arthur T. von Me-
hren (Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., forthcoming 
2007). 
 42. See Paul D. Carrington, The American Tradition of Private Law Enforcement, 5 
German L.J. 1413 (2004), available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php? 
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large Americans and Europeans pursue similar goals with their laws on 
jurisdiction,43 and still each side is deeply critical of the methods the 
other side employs to reach those goals. Differences could reflect varied 
cultural values. But general cultural differences are not significant 
enough to explain the substantial differences in such a technical area as 
the law of jurisdiction.  
C. The Argument from Legal Paradigms  
This Article suggests a response to these challenges that builds on 
the work of both functional comparatists and students of culture, but 
provides a way to explain the persistence of differences that overcomes 
the limits of both: legal paradigms. The hypothesis is that Americans and 
Europeans do not simply think differently about how to apply jurisdic-
tion; they even think differently about what jurisdiction is. Americans 
and Europeans disagree on the answers because they disagree on the 
relevant questions. Similarities of goals notwithstanding, each side re-
mains in its own paradigm of jurisdiction, and these paradigms are 
significantly different. Paradigms explain not only why these differences 
exist, but also why they remain stable despite all the transatlantic efforts 
at agreement and the relative similarity of goals and values. This expla-
nation is seemingly paradoxical: convergence and unification are 
difficult not because of differences but because of similarities. Precisely 
because American and European law provide functionally equivalent 
methods for resolving the same problems, they cannot agree on, much 
less unify, these methods. 
Propounding the notion of paradigmatic difference between U.S. and 
European thinking about jurisdiction makes important contributions both 
to the law of jurisdiction and to the theories and methods of comparative 
law. The contribution to the law of jurisdiction is both explanatory and 
evaluative. On a macro-level, exploring paradigmatic difference contrib-
utes to a mutual understanding of the structure within which Americans 
and Europeans think about issues of jurisdiction. Broadly, Americans 
adopt an “in or out” paradigm that is vertical, unilateral, domestic, and 
political, while Europeans adopt an “us or them” paradigm that is hori-
zontal, multilateral, international, and apolitical. On a micro-level, 
understanding paradigmatic difference can provide a single explanation 
for a wide variety of differences between U.S. and European jurisdic-
tional theory and practice. Taken together, paradigmatic difference 
suggests mutual criticism tends to be biased. As long as each side argues 
                                                                                                                      
id=523; Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int’l L. 251 
(2006). 
 43. See Scoles et al., supra note 9; see also infra, text accompanying notes 57, 58.  
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from within its own paradigm, the approach taken by the other side must 
necessarily seem deficient. 
The second field to which the idea of a paradigmatic difference 
makes a contribution is the theory of convergence, legal unification, and 
comparative law. The common understanding is that unification is easy 
where legal systems are functionally equivalent because each side agrees 
on the goals and disagrees only on the means. Unification is difficult, 
according to this account, only where goal preferences differ strongly. 
By contrast, this Article shows how functional equivalence between dif-
ferent legal orders makes unification more difficult to achieve. Precisely 
where different legal orders reach similar results by different means, 
within different legal paradigms, it is very costly for them to unify those 
means, while the benefits from unification are rather slim. Although the 
theory of legal paradigms builds on functionalist comparative law, it 
represents a significant elaboration that can account for difference and 
for culture.  
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II.A. presents two explana-
tions frequently given to explain the differences between U.S. and 
European jurisdictional law, and shows that both are ultimately insuffi-
cient. Part II.B. introduces functional comparison and show how it can 
actually help stabilize, rather than overcome, difference. Part II.C. intro-
duces the concept of paradigms and paradigmatic difference as a more 
promising explanation for these differences.  
Part III develops this hypothesis by laying out two different para-
digms underlying different legal systems—a vertical, domestic, 
unilateral, political paradigm for U.S. law (Part III.A.), and a horizontal, 
international, multilateral, apolitical paradigm for European laws (Part 
III.B.). An important finding in these two sections is that each of the 
paradigms has ways of accounting for those considerations that are fun-
damental to the other paradigm, but in different ways: through 
subsumption under its own terms, and through externalization to other 
institutions than the law of jurisdiction.  
Part IV applies the findings of paradigmatic difference to five spe-
cific issues on which Americans and Europeans disagree: the role of due 
process; the discrimination against foreign plaintiffs in U.S. courts and 
against foreign defendants in European courts; the relevance of state 
boundaries and extraterritoriality; attitudes towards forum non conven-
iens, antisuit injunctions, and lis alibi pendens; and negotiation styles in 
the efforts to conclude a worldwide judgments convention in the Hague. 
Part V concludes. 
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II. Theoretical Foundations 
How can the differences between U.S. and European approaches to 
the law of personal jurisdiction be explained? Are they differences at the 
level of individual rules and preferences that could be resolved through 
compromise? Do they reflect differences of culture and societal priori-
ties? Are they rather differences in levels of analysis, wherein Americans 
and Europeans ask and address entirely different questions? Or are they 
manifestations of deeper underlying differences between American and 
European jurisdictional thought? These questions must be answered be-
fore chances for mutual understanding can be assessed. While traditional 
functionalist comparative law cannot account for the differences, once it 
is enriched with insights from competing theories, a new theory of legal 
paradigms emerges that can. 
A. Two Partial Explanations 
1. A Superficial Difference of Form? 
The persistent differences between U.S. and European laws of juris-
diction present a puzzle for functionalist comparative law. Comparatists 
in this camp presume that legal systems differ only in their doctrine but 
not in their results; functional comparison discovers similar solutions to 
similar problems.44 Accordingly, comparatists expect prevailing differ-
ences between approaches to jurisdiction to be surmountable through 
mutual understanding or compromise. They find convergence between 
approaches either actually occurring or at least possible, and they have 
had some success in explaining that convergence. Scholars have discov-
ered European equivalents to the U.S. practice of granting jurisdiction 
based on doing business45 and U.S. equivalents to unconventional Euro-
pean bases of jurisdiction.46 They have found European opposition to 
                                                                                                                                 
 44. The classical locus for this postulate is Zweigert & Kötz, supra, note 3, at 40; for 
discussion, see Michaels, supra note 3, at 369–72.  
 45. Ronald A. Brand, The 1999 Hague Preliminary Draft Convention Text on Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments: A View From the United States, in The Hague Preliminary Draft 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Judgments 3, 17–28 (Fausto Pocar & Constanza Hono-
rati eds., 2005); See Harald Müller, Die Gerichtspflichtigkeit wegen “doing business”: 
Ein Vergleich zwischen dem US-amerikanischen und dem deutschen Zuständig-
keitssystem 221–55 (1992). 
 46. See generally Ronald A. Brand, Jurisdictional Common Ground: In Search of a 
Global Convention, in Law and Justice in a Multistate World—Essays in Honor of 
Arthur T. von Mehren 11, 20–21 (James A.R. Nafziger & Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 
2002). 
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forum non conveniens to be less consistent than claimed47 and U.S. reli-
ance on tag jurisdiction less strongly supported than thought.48 Where 
differences exist, functional comparatists have set out to determine 
which of the solutions is superior: they have been willing to accept 
European solutions into U.S. law when those solutions seemed more 
rational—for example, the existence of detailed rules49—and they have 
suggested Europeans adopt U.S. solutions where those seemed supe-
rior—for example, constitutionalization of jurisdictional rules.50  
All this comparative law work is extremely important. It has pro-
vided invaluable insights into functional similarities between seemingly 
different legal systems. It has shown that the differences between U.S. 
and European law are relative and contingent. Some differences exist 
more in perception than in reality, some are real but not decisive because 
they do not lead to different results, and others are real and decisive but 
not central. Indeed, without such comparative analysis, the Hague nego-
tiations would not have been possible.  
However, the strength of the analysis is its greatest weakness. If in-
deed the differences are negligible, then it is unclear why they persist 
and why negotiations at the Hague to overcome them failed. If indeed 
Americans and Europeans pursue the same goals with their laws on ju-
risdiction, it is unclear why no convention can be concluded that is based 
on these similar goals. After all, the negotiations at the Hague were an 
extremely serious and thorough attempt at mutual understanding be-
tween experts. Their ultimate failure is even more remarkable given that 
the negotiators, as experts in conflict of laws, can be expected to have 
even more in common than the societies they represent.51 If not even 
these serious negotiations led to agreement, it seems implausible to ar-
gue that the problem is lack of debate or good will. This suggests these 
differences are not themselves decisive, but rather are symptomatic of 
deeper rifts. 
                                                                                                                                 
 47. See, e.g., Arnaud Nuyts, L’exception de forum non conveniens (Étude de 
Droit International Privé Comparé) 368–456 (2003). 
 48. Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty, 85 Cornell L. 
Rev. 89, 111–12 (1999). 
 49. Id. at 107–10; Kevin M. Clermont, The Role of Private International Law in the 
United States: Beating the Not-Quite-Dead Horse of Jurisdiction, 2 CILE Studies 75, 104, 
110–11 (2005). 
 50. Arnaud Nuyts, Due Process and Fair Trial: Jurisdiction in the United States and in 
Europe Compared, 2 CILE Studies 27, 48–60 (2005). 
 51. See the analysis by Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization 
in International Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 743, 753–61 (1999). 
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2. A Deep Difference of Cultural Values? 
Can legal culture account for the differences? Indeed, some point to 
cultural and sociological differences between Americans and Europeans 
as an explanation for the differences in approach to jurisdiction.52 Since 
culture is an amorphous concept, it may be helpful to turn to Lawrence 
Friedman’s distinction between two kinds of legal culture.53 External 
legal culture describes the general attitude of society towards the law and 
the goals it assigns to law. Internal legal culture, by contrast, describes 
the thoughts, modes, and institutions of participants in the legal system. 
Although a comprehensive analysis is beyond what can be done for 
this Article, the explanation from external culture seems implausible. For 
differences in external culture to explain the differences in jurisdictional 
law, two basic assumptions would have to be met: first, a country’s law 
of jurisdiction must reflect the attitudes of its people; second, Americans 
and Europeans must have different attitudes regarding the issues relevant 
to the law of jurisdiction. Both assumptions, though certainly not wrong, 
have their explanatory limits.  
First, the intuition that the law reflects a society’s preferences is 
problematic. Even if societies as such have preferences that transcend 
the differences between the preferences held by their members, it is 
doubtful that such preferences are reflected directly in the “semi-
autonomous”54 field of law. Public choice theory has shown that even 
statutory law in democratic countries reflects the preferences of legisla-
tors and highly interested, well-organized lobbying groups rather than 
those of society at large. Judge-made law is a similarly inexact mecha-
nism for adapting the law to such extralegal preferences, especially in 
rather technical and procedural areas like the law of jurisdiction. The 
                                                                                                                                 
 52. See Willibald Posch, Resolving Business Disputes Through Litigation or Other 
Alternatives: The Effects of Jurisdictional Rules and Recognition Practice, 26 Hous. J. Int’l 
L. 363, 383 (2004); Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Conflict and Jurisdictional Equilibra-
tion: Paths to a Via Media?, 26 Hous. J. Int’l L. 385, 392–93 (2004). In a more general 
context, Oscar Chase has recently tried to explain American peculiarities with the special 
culture of the United States. Oscar G. Chase, American “Exceptionalism” and Comparative 
Procedure, 50 Am. J. Comp. L. 277 (2002); see also Oscar G. Chase, Law, Culture, and 
Ritual: Disputing Systems in Cross-Cultural Context 78–79, 92–93 (2005) (explain-
ing discretion in personal jurisdiction with American exceptionalism). 
 53. Lawrence M. Friedman, The Legal System 223 (1975) (“The external legal 
culture is the legal culture of the general population; the internal legal culture is the legal cul-
ture of those members of society who perform specialized legal tasks.”). For a critical 
analysis, see Roger Cotterrell, The Concept of Legal Cultures, in Comparing Legal Cul-
tures 13, 17 (David Nelken ed., 1997). 
 54. Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 Law & Soc’y Rev. 719 (1973).  
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explanations from external culture therefore risk circularity:55 legal rules 
and institutions are thought to mirror a society’s cultural preferences, but 
then the only way to determine the society’s preferences is to look at its 
laws. Americans have the jurisdictional regime they have because they 
want it, and we know they want this regime because they have not 
changed it. Whether this congruence of legal regime and societal prefer-
ences exists is unknowable because the hypothesis cannot be tested or 
falsified. 
Second, even if one grants the logical priority of societal preferences 
over legal regimes, it is still doubtful whether attitudinal differences be-
tween Americans and Europeans are significant enough to explain the 
differences in approach.56 American exceptionalism, a popular topic at 
least since de Tocqueville,57 has often been exaggerated. Extreme cultural 
differences would be counterintuitive between societies that are so simi-
lar in economic, political, and historical respects.  
If external legal culture does not provide a sufficient explanation, 
then internal legal culture well may. Indeed, the different ways in which 
Americans and Europeans talk about jurisdiction and the different issues 
they consider relevant suggest a difference in internal legal culture. 
American and European lawyers think differently about jurisdictional 
issues because each side is constrained by the framework within which it 
conceives of the subject.  
However, this explanation has two shortcomings as well. First, its 
focus on the views of individual actors in the legal system is unsatisfac-
tory: individual views are hard to determine, and the rationality of the 
legal system as a whole likely transcends that of any one participant in it. 
The knowledge sought is therefore rather one of the system itself than of 
its participants. Second, the explanation does not explain in what specific 
way the internal legal culture of one side differs from the other. Again, 
simply to say that the laws are different because the internal legal cul-
tures are different becomes a circular explanation if the claim of 
difference between legal cultures merely restates the differences between 
laws. What is required is a more specific analysis of the relationship be-
tween individual legal provisions and institutions and the legal system as 
                                                                                                                                 
 55. William B. Ewald, What’s So Special About American Law?, 26 Okla. City U. L. 
Rev. 1083, 1098 (2001); David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in Adapt-
ing Legal Cultures 7, 27 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001). 
 56. Clermont, supra note 49, at 96. 
 57. See Chase, American “Exceptionalism”, supra note 52, for a discussion of the 
influence of American culture on civil procedure; for a recent overview of American excep-
tionalism, see Mark B. Rotenberg, America’s Ambiguous Exceptionalism, 3 U. St. Thomas 
L.J. 188 (2005). 
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a whole, between the goals of the law of jurisdiction broadly understood 
and the means used to achieve those goals. 
B. Functional Equivalence 
A proper explanation for the differences between U.S. and European 
thinking about jurisdiction must pull these insights together. On the one 
hand, it must remain within the law without taking recourse to general 
societal culture, because culture and its relation to the legal rules and 
institutions are unclear. On the other hand, it must go beyond not only 
the realm of mere individual rules, but also that of style and of 
institutions and sources of law. It must show how the individual 
peculiarities of legal systems are linked to each other to create a coherent 
whole. In short, the explanation must encompass the law as a whole, but 
nothing beyond the law. What starts as a functionalist micro-comparison 
between individual rules becomes a macro-comparison between entire 
systems of law. 
1. A Difference of Levels of Analysis? 
Indeed, closer analysis reveals that not one but (at least) two func-
tions are present in jurisdictional law and theory in the United States as 
in Europe. The U.S. Supreme Court formulated these two functions of 
the law of jurisdiction as follows: “It protects the defendant against the 
burden of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum. And it acts to en-
sure that the States, through their courts, do not reach out beyond the 
limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal 
system.”58 These two functions are not peculiar to the United States; they 
are also fundamental to European jurisdictional law.59 
Although Americans and Europeans agree on these two objectives, 
they do not use their laws on jurisdiction for the same functions. Un-
knowingly, American and European approaches to jurisdiction are 
responses to different questions asked, as an insightful recent article by 
Arnaud Nuyts shows.60 Nuyts’ main point is that the principles developed 
under the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and the rules of 
the Brussels Regulation “each operate at a different level and accordingly 
                                                                                                                                 
 58. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). The respective 
role of these two goals is unclear in view of Insurance Corp. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982).  
 59. Ralf Michaels, Re-Placements—Jurisdiction for Contracts and Torts under the 
Brussels I Regulation when Arts. 5(1) and 5(3) Do Not Designate a Place in a Member State, 
in International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States,  supra 
note 25, at 151. 
 60. Nuyts, supra note 50. 
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cannot be directly compared.”61 If the American focus is on the protec-
tion of due process, while the European emphasis is on listing available 
bases of jurisdiction, this is not just another difference between the two 
approaches; it is evidence that the U.S. Constitution and the Brussels 
Regulation serve different purposes. What Americans mean by “jurisdic-
tion” is simply not the same as what Europeans mean by the term. For 
Nuyts, it follows that the U.S. Constitution and the Brussels Regulation 
cannot be meaningfully compared, because they are not functionally 
equivalent. A proper approach must compare rules serving the same 
functions.62 It must find the functional equivalent for the Due Process 
Clause in European law, and the functional equivalent for the Brussels 
Regulation in U.S. law. 
The first of the two levels of analysis Nuyts proposes is the delimita-
tion of the outer limits of jurisdiction. In the United States, this level is 
occupied by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has been careful to make 
clear that it identifies only the boundaries of jurisdiction, not jurisdic-
tional rules themselves.63 A “one-step test” of jurisdiction, whereby 
jurisdiction would simply be conferred by the U.S. Constitution,64 is not 
in accordance with U.S. law. It is often claimed that such constitutional 
control of jurisdiction is absent or at least deficient in the European con-
text.65 Nuyts points out, however, that Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the safeguard of a fair trial in 
Europe, has the potential to perform the same functions as the Due Proc-
ess Clause in the United States.66 Indeed, he can cite to one little known 
decision of the European Commission on Human Rights for limiting 
jurisdiction under traditional English law.67 
                                                                                                                                 
 61. Id. at 30 (emphasis in original). 
 62. Zweigert & Kötz, supra note 3, at 34. 
 63. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 106 (1987); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413 (1984); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 
770, 775 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292.  
 64. See Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982). 
 65. For developments in German law, see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 142–178. 
 66. Nuyts, supra note 47, at 50–60; see also Pascal Grolimund, Human Rights and 
Jurisdiction: General Observations and Impact on the Doctrines of Forum Non Conveniens 
and Forum Conveniens, 4 Eur. J.L. Reform 87 (2002); Emmanuel Guinchard, Procès équi-
table (article 6 CESDH) et droit international privé, in International Civil Litigation in 
Europe and Third States 199 (Arnaud Nuyts & Nadine Watté eds., 2005); Dany Cohen, La 
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et le droit international privé français, 78 Re-
vue Critique de Droit International Privé 451, 463 (1989); contra Jonathan Hill, The 
Exercise of Jurisdiction in Private International Law, in Asserting Jurisdiction: Interna-
tional and European Perspectives 39, 40–41 (Capps, Evans & Konstadinidis eds., 2003). 
 67. Decision of the European Commision on Human Rights, Complaint No. 6200/73, 
May 13, 1976 (unpublished), in 2 Digest of Strasbourg Case-Law Relating to the 
European Convention on Human Rights 269 (1984); see also Adrian Briggs & Peter 
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The second level in Nuyts’ proposed two-level analysis is the elabo-
ration of specific rules. In Europe, the elaboration of such rules is carried 
out in the provisions of the Brussels Regulation.68 Although in the United 
States such rules are often all but ignored in practice, the Constitution 
alone is not sufficient here, either. Jurisdiction of state courts is a matter 
of state law and therefore requires a basis in state law, either in common 
law or in a statutory provision.69 The same is true, with exceptions (espe-
cially for federal statutory authority), for federal courts, whose 
jurisdiction is governed by the rules of the state in which they are situ-
ated.70 The statutes of many states do not add any further restrictions to 
those granted by the U.S. Constitution; they extend jurisdiction accord-
ing to the limits of the U.S. Constitution.71 But some states such as New 
York that deal frequently with international commercial litigation have 
rules on jurisdiction that are hardly less specific than the rules of the 
Brussels Regulation.72 Nuyts argues that this second step of jurisdictional 
analysis should be enhanced in the United States.73 
Nuyts’ analysis is eye-opening, because it moves into the spotlight of 
jurisdictional analysis two bodies of law that have traditionally been 
largely ignored: the European Convention on Human Rights and the 
states’ long-arm statutes in the United States. Moreover, the two-level 
analysis provides a good explanation for many of the differences be-
tween U.S. and European law on jurisdiction. If the function of U.S. law 
is the protection of substantive rights of defendants, it is not surprising 
that U.S. law is based on the Constitution, shaped by judges, formulated 
in standards and principles rather than rules, and aimed at individual 
cases rather than general consistency. The case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights is quite similar in all these regards, and if indeed 
                                                                                                                      
Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments 12, 19 (Peter Rees ed., 3d ed. 2002). Since all 
these decisions and authors concerned English law of jurisdiction, which is in many ways 
similar to that in the United States, they do not represent clear precedents for a similar func-
tion of ECHR Art. 6(1) for civil law rules or even the Brussels I Regulation. But see Cass. civ., 
Mar. 30, 2004, JCP 2004 II 10097 at 1129 (discussing but rejecting a violation of Art. 6(1) by 
French Civil Code Art. 15).  
 68. Supra note 18. 
 69. Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: End of the Century or Beginning of 
the Millennium?, 7 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 111, 112–14 (1999). 
 70. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); for further exceptions, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(B) and 
4(k)(2). 
 71. For analysis of this issue, see Douglas D. McFarland, Dictum Run Wild: How Long-
Arm Statutes Extended to the Limits of Due Process, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 491, 525–531 (2004); 
for a slightly different grouping, see Weintraub, supra, note 14, at 203–05.  
 72. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302 (McKinney 2003). Some state courts have wrenched restricting 
language out of shape to achieve as much jurisdiction as permitted. But see Schlosser, supra 
note 17, at 21 (“[N]othing exists in civil-law countries which could properly be called a long-
arm statute”). 
 73. Nuyts, supra note 50, at 66–67; see also Clermont, supra note 49, at 104, 110–12. 
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that Court accepted Nuyts’ challenge and took on jurisdiction, there is no 
reason to think it would act much differently. On the other hand, where 
U.S. courts are asked to interpret long arm statutes independently from 
the U.S. Constitution, they defer to statutory texts, apply hard and fast 
rules rather than open standards, and thereby enhance consistency rather 
than justice in the individual case.74 
Theoretically, U.S. and European law could converge on the path 
Nuyts describes. More constitutional control of jurisdiction in Europe 
would soften criticism of European law as unjust. If American law of 
jurisdiction developed more in state law and through legislators, the 
Constitution could be reserved, as has been demanded repeatedly, to the 
role of an outer limit. At present, however, neither is the case, and this is 
a situation that Nuyts’ analysis alone cannot explain. If “it is not difficult 
to find examples in the Brussels Convention/Regulation where the fair 
trial doctrine could alter traditional ways in which the rules of jurisdic-
tion are applied,”75 an explanation is needed for why such alterations 
have not yet taken place. Nuyts’ comparison of the two steps cannot ex-
plain why each legal system concentrates its debates on only one of the 
two levels. 
2. Functional Equivalence and the Stability of Difference 
Nuyts’ analysis provides a good tool to explain the difference, but 
not its persistence. An explanation for this persistence lies in path de-
pendency. The fact that one of the levels of jurisdictional analysis is 
inadequately elaborated in each of the two legal systems means that the 
respective institution acting mainly on one level must also fulfill the re-
quirements posed on the other level. This explains why the U.S. 
Constitution and the Brussels Regulation are more important, respec-
tively, than the long arm statutes and the European Convention on 
Human Rights. It also explains why they can remain stronger.76 The 
Brussels Regulation and the U.S. Constitution are, in fact, functionally 
equivalent, because each of them fulfills both functions. 
In the United States, the Due Process Clause is used for far more 
than determination of broad outer limits;77 by now it provides, together 
                                                                                                                                 
 74. Clermont, supra note 49, at 102–103, 105. 
 75. Nuyts, supra note 50, at 58. 
 76. This does not rule out other possible explanations. For example, both the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights are much younger 
and weaker than the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. Supreme Court. However, this explanation 
is made less plausible in view of the fact that the European Court of Human Rights has been 
quite active in other areas of the law, such as privacy and discrimination law.  
 77. Jay Conison, What Does Due Process Have to Do with Jurisdiction?, 46 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 1071 (1994). 
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with the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, a detailed system of rules 
and principles of jurisdiction. This was not always so. James Weinstein 
has shown how much of today’s jurisdictional law was developed origi-
nally as sub-constitutional federal law, not as constitutional law.78 Yet 
after the Pennoyer decision in 1878, the Constitution became the most 
important source of jurisdictional law, and when federal common law 
was all but abolished in 1938,79 further development moved, unlike other 
areas of the law, down to the states, but rather up to the level of the U.S. 
Constitution. Some of the detailed rules developed by the Supreme Court 
cannot be derived from the Due Process Clause, either because they have 
nothing to do with due process,80 or because they are incompatible with 
the normal interpretation of the clause.81 Nonetheless, since state law, 
both statutory and common law, has been all but irrelevant in the devel-
opment of jurisdictional legal thinking, the task of formulating 
jurisdictional rules remained, necessarily, with the U.S. Constitution and 
the courts applying it. Even if detailed jurisdictional rules exist in state 
law, courts nonetheless frequently focus almost their entire analysis on 
the Constitution.82 Although critics ask the Supreme Court to restrict its 
opinions on jurisdiction to the prevention of truly outrageous violations 
of due process,83 path dependency ensures that the role of the Due Proc-
ess Clause remains prominent. Since U.S. Constitutional jurisprudence is 
now relatively detailed, state legislators could codify these rules or re-
strict jurisdiction further, but there is no political incentive for them to do 
either. 
In Europe, the opposite is true. The ECJ has developed the seem-
ingly technical rules of the Brussels Regulation into a system in which 
the protection of defendants, codified in Article 2 (which gives general 
jurisdiction to the courts at the defendant’s domicile) has quasi-
constitutional status.84 One may argue that these restrictions are not part 
of the Regulation itself. However, like in the United States, path  
                                                                                                                                 
 78. James Weinstein, The Federal Common Law Origins of Judicial Jurisdiction: Im-
plications for Modern Doctrine, 90 Va. L. Rev. 169, 192–204 (2004) (analyzing cases before 
Pennoyer v. Neff that emphasized the service requirement for jurisdiction). 
 79. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 80. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 174 (“Nor will the Court ever be able to fully explain 
in due process terms rules formulated primarily to vindicate structural values rather than indi-
vidual rights.”); see also Clermont, supra note 49, at 101 (“The well-known failures of the 
current law flow from the U.S. Supreme Court trying to do too much in shaping that law out 
of the few bare words of the Constitution.”). 
 81. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 270–276. 
 82. See, e.g., Int’l Techs. Consultants, Inc. v. Euroglas S.A., 107 F.3d 386, 391, 393 (6th 
Cir. 1997). 
 83. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, Due Process Limitations on the Personal Jurisdic-
tion of State Courts: Time for Change, 63 Or. L. Rev. 485, 527–28 (1984). 
 84. See infra Part III.B. 
MICHAELS FTP3.DOC 1/2/2007 11:15 AM 
1022 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:1003 
dependency makes the state of affairs relatively stable. The more willing 
the Court of Justice is to read restrictions into the text of the Brussels 
Regulation, the less desirable or necessary it becomes for other institu-
tions like the European Court of Human Rights to interfere on the basis 
of other texts. 
C. Paradigmatic Difference 
Path dependency can explain why difference exist, but cannot, by it-
self, account for what constitutes this difference. This is where 
paradigms become attractive.  
1. The Idea of Legal Paradigms 
Although the concept of the paradigm is frequently invoked without 
clear definition, it is possible to develop a sufficiently clear concept for 
the purpose of comparative law. Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warring-
ton, drawing on Thomas Kuhn,85 define a paradigm as  
the common framework within which theories are developed and 
scientific discussions are pursued. It implies a common scientific 
language, a common set of concepts and a common basic world 
view. If one does not accept the commonly used concepts and/or 
the commonly accepted ideology, it is no longer possible to de-
velop theories within that science as it has been traditionally 
conceived.86 
A legal paradigm is, thus, a thought pattern, an epistemic back-
ground for analysis, the way participants of a legal system discuss 
matters of jurisdiction. A paradigm does not define specific rules or insti-
tutions—different views on almost any issue are possible within one 
paradigm. Instead, a paradigm defines what questions are relevant for 
analysis and what kinds of factors can be relevant. Since paradigms are 
often unstated, they must be induced from the actual practice of partici-
pants in the analysis. The way judges and scholars argue about issues of 
jurisdiction reveals their (often unstated) basic understanding of jurisdic-
tion. 
Paradigms are different from principles. Principles bring coherence 
to an otherwise seemingly disparate body of case law by revealing basic 
valuations underlying whole areas of the law, provided either explicitly 
                                                                                                                                 
 85. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 11, passim (2d 
ed. 1970). 
 86. Mark Van Hoecke & Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal 
Doctrine: Towards a New Model for Comparative Law, 47 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 495, 513 
(1998). 
MICHAELS FTP3.DOC 1/2/2007 11:15 AM 
Summer 2006] Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction 1023 
by lawmakers or implicitly by the development of the law. For example, 
the general idea that plaintiffs must seek out defendants (actor sequitur 
forum rei), often invoked by the ECJ for the interpretation of rules, is a 
principle of European jurisdictional law.87 This focus on broad areas of 
the law is a quality principles share with paradigms. But principles are 
not paradigms. While principles determine, at least to some degree, the 
answers to questions, paradigms determine the structure in which ques-
tions are asked and answered. Grossly divergent answers to a question 
are impossible within one principle, but they are quite possible within 
one paradigm. Principles are a matter for debate within a legal commu-
nity; paradigms are the epistemic frameworks within which these 
debates take place. The actor sequitur forum rei principle can be ex-
plained on the basis of the European paradigm of jurisdiction,88 but it is 
not a necessary part of that paradigm. 
Paradigms also differ from concepts. Of course, saying that Ameri-
cans and Europeans understand the term jurisdiction differently implies 
that they have different concepts of jurisdiction. But paradigms are more 
than concepts because they contain not just the meaning of a particular 
institution, but rather the whole set of instruments, argumentative modes, 
and theories connected with this institution, as well as other, related in-
stitutions. An analysis of jurisdiction as a concept will focus on what that 
notion implies in a given legal system. An analysis of the paradigm of 
jurisdiction will focus also on related doctrines and their interaction and 
mutual interdependency with the institution properly called jurisdiction. 
Paradigms differ from theories.89 Both paradigms and theories of ju-
risdiction provide modes of analysis considered appropriate for a certain 
legal issue, but there are three important differences. First, paradigms act 
on a more abstract and general level than theories; indeed, they can en-
compass several theories. For example, different theories have been 
developed for U.S. law of jurisdiction—power theories, relational theo-
ries, fairness and convenience theories. While these theories compete 
with each other, they are all developed within, and compatible with, one 
paradigm of jurisdiction.90 Second, theories can be tested and falsified by 
results; one theory is superior to another if it can better account for spe-
cific results. Paradigms, by contrast, are compatible with different 
                                                                                                                                 
 87. See, e.g., Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. 
Co., 2000 E.C.R. I-5925, paras. 34–35; Nuyts, supra note 47, at 672–76. For a U.S. law per-
spective, cf. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 610, 667 
(1988) (“general jurisdiction should be retained solely at a defendant’s home base”). 
 88. See infra, part IV.B. 
 89. Legal theory is a problematic concept, too. See James Penner, Decent Burials for 
Dead Concepts, 58 Current Legal Probs. 313 (2005).  
 90. See infra Part III.A. 
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results. They can be tested and falsified, not against results, but against 
modes of thought and types of argument. Specific arguments and theories 
may be more compatible with one paradigm than with another, as will be 
shown with the different U.S. theories in the European context.91 Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, theories are necessarily manifest, while 
paradigms can be latent. In this regard, analysis of paradigms starts 
where theories end, because such analysis can reveal underlying, yet un-
recognized, similarities between different theories. 
In their focus on latent, manifest aspects of the law, paradigms share 
characteristics with external legal culture or mentalité.92 External legal 
culture, at least in the way the concept is frequently used in comparative 
law, denotes an extralegal set of values and practices that explains the 
behavior of legal actors. It can thus explain different theories of jurisdic-
tion with regard to different institutional and societal factors. For 
example, the expansive approach that U.S. courts take towards jurisdic-
tion might be explained with the societal emphasis on incentives for 
plaintiffs and their lawyers, for judges seeking reelections, or the general 
societal interest in achieving justice for victims. All these explanations 
focus on factors external to the law. By contrast, a paradigm defines the 
inner structure of a legal system and the way in which participants dis-
cuss it. Its explanations for the arguments made, and the consequences 
drawn, are intrinsic to the legal system, not extrinsic to it. In this sense, 
paradigms are more closely related to internal legal culture. 
2. Subsumption and Externalization of Competing Considerations 
It is important to note that paradigms do not reflect differences in 
values; they reflect different ways of dealing with potentially similar 
preferences. Nonetheless, values play a unique role in each paradigm. 
For example, I will argue that the U.S. paradigm of jurisdiction focuses 
mainly on the vertical relationship between the court and the parties, 
neglecting the horizontal relationship between different states or coun-
tries. This means that certain values—the protection of defendants, for 
example—can easily be conceptualized, while other, possibly competing 
values—the protection of legitimate interests of other states—cannot. 
This does not mean these competing values necessarily play a lesser role 
in the legal system as a whole, but it does mean that they are more diffi-
cult to conceptualize within one paradigm. Paradigms require a relative 
degree of inherent consistency, but they must also account in some way 
for the internal frictions and tensions of the legal system that tend to un-
                                                                                                                                 
 91. Infra Part III.B.1. 
 92. See H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Cultures and Legal Traditions, in Epistemology and 
Methodology of Comparative Law 7 (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004). 
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dermine this consistency. Paradigms have two specific ways of dealing 
with considerations that seem to undermine them: one is to subsume 
them into their own mode of thought; the other is to externalize them to 
other areas of the law. 
Subsumption involves the translation of ideas that are incompatible 
with a certain paradigm into ideas that are compatible. Although, for in-
stance, the horizontal relation between a court and foreign states cannot 
be considered as such in a vertical paradigm, it can be considered once it 
is translated into a vertical relation. This is the case where the Due Proc-
ess Clause is used to account for the interests of other states.93 Subsumed 
considerations are not necessarily less relevant than others. In effect, 
ideas that are incompatible with a paradigm in their original form may, 
after their subsumption, be protected just as well as, or even better than, 
they would in a horizontal paradigm. But they are not protected in their 
original form—they are protected as considerations that have been re-
molded to fit the paradigm. 
Externalization involves the transposition of ideas that are incom-
patible with a certain paradigm out of the core institutions associated 
with the paradigm. In a legal system with a vertical paradigm of jurisdic-
tion, horizontal relations between courts and foreign states can be dealt 
with by means other than those contained in the law of jurisdiction. For 
example, the interests of other states can be addressed at the stage of 
recognition and enforcement94 or through a political question doctrine.95 
Those alternate methods are then functional equivalents of the law of 
jurisdiction—they perform the same functions by different means. 
Again, externalized considerations need not be less relevant for the legal 
system as a whole. 
Subsumption and externalization are by no means peripheral—they 
are central to the internal consistency of paradigms. Any paradigm alone 
must necessarily be incomplete. The relative consistency and reduction 
of complexity a paradigm achieves come at the cost of its inability to 
account, directly, for the inner frictions existing in any area of the law. 
Subsumption and externalization are necessary ways to deal with these 
frictions and complexities. Without them, a paradigm would not be vi-
able, and its description would not be complete.  
3. Paradigms and Comparative Law  
In theory, it may be possible to find paradigms underlying a legal 
system’s conception of jurisdiction by mere analysis of one legal system, 
                                                                                                                                 
 93. Infra Part III.A.3. 
 94. Infra Part III.A.3. 
 95. Infra Part III.A.3. 
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without regard to other systems. But it would be both insufficient and 
unwise to do so. It would be insufficient because decisions on  
international jurisdiction do not occur in isolation but rather in an inter-
play, willing or not, with the international jurisdiction exercised by 
foreign courts. It would be unwise because comparison enables a dra-
matically better view of any legal system, especially because it typically 
shows elements to be contingent that participants take to be essential. 
Paradigms are frequently unstated, and participants in legal discourse are 
frequently unaware of the boundaries set up by the paradigms within 
which they think. One of the most important insights provided by 
Kuhn’s study on paradigm shift96 was precisely that the inadequacies and 
contingencies of a paradigm only become visible when a new paradigm 
has replaced the earlier one. This external viewpoint that illuminates a 
paradigm can be provided equally well through comparative law, as Clif-
ford Geertz has emphasized.97 The alternative paradigm, through which 
these contingencies become visible, can come from a different legal sys-
tem. The frequent observation that one cannot completely understand 
one’s own law until one sees it through the eyes of a foreign legal system 
is particularly apt in the study of paradigms. 
A caveat is necessary. A paradigmatic account must be painted with 
a broad brush. First, some details within each system must be neglected. 
The aim is to draw an image that, if not complete, is at least accurate. It 
is not to present each detail but rather to show how essential considera-
tions appear in both paradigms, only in very different forms: as a 
principle in one and as a mere reflex in the other; at the center of one and 
externalized to another area of the law by the other. This is how func-
tional equivalence and paradigmatic difference coexist. Second, this 
Article largely ignores the existing opposition within each tradition to its 
own paradigm. Kuhn’s point that paradigms often experience internal 
frictions before a shift takes place98 applies to paradigms of jurisdiction 
as well. Here, the emphasis lies on presentation of the paradigms as they 
exist, but that does not imply that they are immutable, nor that they have 
always characterized the law in the United States and in Europe. Third, 
however, since paradigms can either subsume or externalize competing 
considerations, they maintain a certain degree of stability against irrita-
tions. Further, this stability ensures that paradigms can maintain their 
                                                                                                                                 
 96. Kuhn, supra note 85. 
 97. Clifford Geertz, Local Knowledge 167–234 (1983). For connections with 
Kuhn, see Clifford Geertz, Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Phi-
losophical Topics 160–66 (2000). See also George Fletcher, Comparative Law as a 
Subversive Discipline, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 683 (1998). 
 98. Kuhn, supra note 85, at 84 (noting, however, that anomalies need not lead to para-
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distinct structure over time. In this sense, paradigms are contingent but 
not arbitrary—they are intrinsic to legal systems.  
III. Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction 
A difference in paradigms can be particularly beneficial in explain-
ing the differences between U.S. and European laws of jurisdiction. The 
U.S. paradigm, at least after International Shoe v. Washington,99 can be 
called “in or out”—it is vertical, unilateral, domestic, and political. The 
European paradigm can be labeled “us or them”—horizontal, multilat-
eral, international, and apolitical. This implies the existence of various 
interconnected dichotomies. The vertical/horizontal dichotomy describes 
whether a legal system focuses on the vertical relation between the court 
and the parties or on the horizontal relation between the forum state and 
other states. The unilateral/multilateral dichotomy describes whether the 
approach a legal system takes to issues of jurisdiction could potentially 
apply without frictions for all other legal systems (multilateral), or 
whether its focus is on its own relation to the case before it in disregard 
of potential claims of other legal systems (unilateral). The domes-
tic/international dichotomy is in many ways a combination of these two: 
it describes whether a legal system regards jurisdictional issues as do-
mestic or as interstate (international) in nature. The political/apolitical 
dichotomy describes whether a legal system perceives a need to justify 
politically the exercise of jurisdiction, or whether it thinks of jurisdiction 
as an apolitical matter that can be justified otherwise. 
A. “In or out”—The U.S. Paradigm of Jurisdiction 
In order to test whether the debate over jurisdiction in the United 
States can be explained with an “in or out” paradigm, I first present the 
competing normative theories that have been offered for the law of juris-
diction before analyzing how well they fit under the paradigm, and how 
competing considerations are either subsumed into, or externalized out 
of, the paradigm. 
1. American Thinking About Jurisdiction 
Given how uneven the history of the law of jurisdiction has been in 
the United States, can one really lump all approaches together within one 
paradigm? A good starting point is the theoretical work performed in the 
discipline. Arthur von Mehren identifies three kinds of theories of juris-
diction, which he draws from American law but believes to be applicable 
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to any contemporary legal order:100 relational theories, power theories, 
and fairness theories.101 Relational theories focus on the relation of alle-
giance between a government and the individuals falling under its 
jurisdiction as a consequence of this relation.102 Power theories see the 
court’s power over the defendant as the basis of jurisdiction.103 Fairness 
theories, ask whether it is fair, as between the parties, to submit the de-
fendant to the jurisdiction of the court. Lea Brilmayer, using slightly 
different terminology, identifies sovereignty theories, convenience theo-
ries, and power theories.104 Her convenience theory is similar to what von 
Mehren calls a fairness theory; her sovereignty theory can be treated 
here as structurally similar to von Mehren’s relational theory, and her 
sovereignty theory is very close to von Mehren’s relational theory. 
The power theory is famously encapsulated in Justice Holmes’ asser-
tion that “[t]he foundation of jurisdiction is physical power . . . .”105 The 
basis of the theory is the relationship of domination and submission be-
tween the court and the defendant. In ancient England, this meant actual 
power. Jurisdiction was asserted over the defendant by physical arrest, to 
ensure his presence at the trial. Since then, the assertion of power has 
changed from actual to symbolic;106 the public and actual assertion of 
power is now privatized107 and symbolized in service of process by the 
plaintiff or her attorneys. Two decisions frequently explained with a 
power theory are Pennoyer v. Neff108 and Burnham v. Superior Court of 
California.109 Pennoyer established that service of process is necessary to 
give a court power and therefore jurisdiction; Burnham made clear that 
service of process is sufficient to give a court jurisdiction, because, at 
least for traditional bases of jurisdiction like service, nothing beyond 
power is necessary. 
The second relevant set of theories are relational and sovereignty 
theories. Although von Mehren suggests that relational theories of juris-
                                                                                                                                 
 100. Arthur T. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction: General Theories Compared and 
Evaluated, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 279, 281–82 (1983). 
 101. Id. at 283–4; von Mehren, supra note 10, at 31–36. 
 102. von Mehren, supra note 100, at 283. 
 103. Id. at 283, 285–87. 
 104. Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 268–75 (2d ed. 1995). 
 105. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917). 
 106. Cf. Evan Tsen Lee, The Dubious Concept of Jurisdiction, 54 Hastings L.J. 1613, 
1615–1620 (2003) (arguing that when we talk of power we really mean legitimate authority). 
 107. Cf. Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Per-
sonal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 705–14 (1987) (discussing how due process shifted in 
emphasis from public sovereign to private individual concerns). 
 108. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 109. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
MICHAELS FTP3.DOC 1/2/2007 11:15 AM 
Summer 2006] Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction 1029 
diction no longer exist in the real world,110 it is nevertheless fruitful to 
scrutinize such theories with an eye to discerning their paradigmatic 
framework. A relational theory gives jurisdiction to the courts of a sover-
eign if and because the defendant owes the sovereign allegiance. The 
clearest example can be found in feudal relations, where the lord’s juris-
diction over his fee-holders is based on the feudal relation between the 
two. Relational arguments still may explain some contemporary jurisdic-
tional discourse in the United States. For example, although “doing 
business” jurisdiction was historically based on the fiction of a corpora-
tion’s presence in a certain territory, the fact that it requires voluntary 
conduct fits well with a fiction of consent. Jurisdiction is then based on 
the relationship established through the defendant’s consent. Lea Bril-
mayer’s sovereignty theory of jurisdiction, in which jurisdiction as the 
enforcement of sovereignty must be justified by some act of submission 
to the sovereign, comes close to a relational theory of jurisdiction; the 
necessary relation is no longer a feudal one but one of legitimate sover-
eignty.111 
The third kind of theory of jurisdiction is the fairness or convenience 
theory. Much of the U.S. Supreme Court case law in the twentieth cen-
tury, starting with International Shoe,112 has been explained with such a 
theory. The main focus of this kind of theory is not the power of the 
court over the defendant, but rather whether it would be inconvenient for 
her to defend herself in a forum she did not choose. The U.S. Supreme 
Court formulated a two-prong test in International Shoe, relying on 
minimum contacts and substantial fairness to the defendant; a third re-
quirement of reasonableness was added later.113 Fairness theories focus 
on the relationship between the litigants and the forum, as well as that 
between the underlying controversy and the forum,114 but unlike rela-
tional theories, the question is one of fairness regardless of sovereignty 
considerations. 
                                                                                                                                 
 110. von Mehren, supra note 100, at 283; but see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 186–88 
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 111. Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 269–70. 
 112. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 113. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987); 
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It is necessary neither to decide which of these theories is norma-
tively or descriptively the most attractive, nor to add to the numerous 
analyses of the U.S. Supreme Court’s oscillation in the twentieth century 
between a power and a fairness theory. Michael Solimine has plausibly 
argued that the shifts in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence had limited 
impact on actual decisions in lower courts.115 This supports the intuition 
that the differences between the theories, though certainly real and con-
siderable, are not paradigmatic; all theories exist within the same 
paradigm. 
2. A Vertical, Unilateral, Domestic, Political Paradigm 
First, the focus of all these theories is vertical.116 Nearly all attention 
goes to the vertical relation between the court and the defendant. The 
power theory focuses on the power relation between court and defen-
dant, both in its actual and its hypothetical form. Whether power is real, 
as in old English law, or symbolic, as in modern U.S. law, matters little 
in this regard. The relational theory and the sovereignty theory are dif-
ferent only insofar as they focus on the underlying legitimizing basis for 
the assertion or jurisdiction rather than on sheer power. They are similar, 
however, in that they also focus on the vertical relation between the court 
and the parties; they both ask whether the assertion of jurisdiction by the 
court is legitimate vis-à-vis the parties. The same is true for the conven-
ience theory. 
Fairness theories may not appear vertical at first sight, since they 
seem to emphasize fairness in the horizontal relation between the parties 
over the vertical relation between the court and the defendant. But in 
their application, the real focus is again on the relation between the court 
and the defendant and whether it is fair for the court, in this relation, to 
assert jurisdiction over the defendant. A horizontal fairness theory focus-
ing rigorously on the relations between the parties would have to 
consider the plaintiff’s interests in litigating at the place of his choice 
and weigh these interests against those of the defendant. Yet the fairness 
theory, as applied by U.S. courts, rarely takes these competing interests 
of plaintiffs into account.117 The decision in Keeton v. Hustler118 provides 
an example: although the plaintiff had no connection to the forum and 
                                                                                                                                 
 115. Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet Revolution in Personal Jurisdiction, 73 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1 (1998). 
 116. See Lea Brilmayer, Jurisdictional Due Process and Political Theory, 26 U. Fla. L. 
Rev. 293, 295–99 (1987). 
 117. See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limits on State Court Juris-
diction, 1980 Sup. Ct. Rev. 77, 111 (1980); Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 273; von Mehren, 
supra note 10, at 191; see also infra, Parts IV.A, IV.B. 
 118. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 770 (1984).  
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had obviously engaged in forum shopping, the Court considered it suffi-
cient for jurisdiction that the defendant had minimum contacts, even 
though those were relatively insignificant as well. This obliviousness to 
the relative interests of plaintiffs and defendants is easy to explain if the 
fairness theory is conceived as a vertical one in which only the relation-
ship between the court and the parties matters, and the relationship 
between the parties is irrelevant. 
Second, these theories are unilateral. They determine whether the 
courts of a state have jurisdiction or not, regardless of whether the courts 
of other states also have jurisdiction. For example, if the power theory 
“never succeeded in producing exclusive jurisdiction,”119 this may be due 
to the fact that the exclusion of foreign jurisdiction was never its aim in 
the first place. In determining a state’s power over a defendant, it is 
irrelevant whether other states have similar power. Similarly, a relational 
test asks only whether a relationship between the court and the litigants 
in the dispute exists, not whether this is the only or the most important 
relation. A fairness test is also unilateral. At stake is whether it is fair for 
a state to assert jurisdiction over the defendant, not whether it is fairer 
for this state than for others to do so. Courts will ask whether it is 
inconvenient for the defendant to defend herself, not whether it is more 
inconvenient before this than before another forum. In fact, the fairness 
test would not make sense otherwise because it is almost always more 
convenient for a defendant to be sued in her home forum than elsewhere. 
This unilateralism underlies even reformist literature. Paul Schiff 
Berman’s important article on the globalization of jurisdiction120 
convincingly discards many of the assumptions underlying current 
thinking about jurisdiction, especially that of territoriality. Berman’s own 
solution, however, remains squarely within a unilateral paradigm: each 
community decides about its own jurisdiction in isolation from the 
claims of others; “international” (or inter-community) considerations 
only appear at the recognition stage when these communities must try to 
convince other communities of their own jurisdiction.121 Even where 
Berman argues that communities should exercise a “cosmopolitan” atti-
tude and defer to the jurisdictional claims of others,122 he does so on a 
                                                                                                                                 
 119. Clermont, supra note 49, at 99–100. 
 120. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 311 
(2002). 
 121. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law and Globalization, 43 Colum. J. 
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 122. Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Redefin-
ing Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1819, 1834–39, 1868–71 
(2005). 
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unilateral basis—he proposes a cosmopolitan community that transcends 
the various communities that might assert jurisdiction123 and thereby 
turns all multilateral issues into internal issues. 
Third, all theories can be labeled domestic. This means that jurisdic-
tion is a local issue, determined by the limits that national (or state) law 
sets for its own courts. The question is whether the dispute brought to 
the court lies within, or outside of, the state’s boundaries, inside or out-
side the state’s legal order. Unlike in an international paradigm, in a 
domestic paradigm it is largely irrelevant whether the courts of other 
states would more appropriately exercise jurisdiction. Matters of juris-
diction are domestic matters; foreign national interests are relevant only 
insofar as they can be translated into such domestic matters. 
All three types of jurisdictional theories can be shown to remain 
within a domestic paradigm. The power theory and the rela-
tional/sovereignty theory are obviously most compatible with a domestic 
paradigm; they ask whether the defendant or the dispute is within the 
sovereign power of the court exercising jurisdiction. Though less obvi-
ous, the same is true for a fairness theory. Fairness, as a requirement of 
jurisdiction, is fairness to the defendant, not fairness to other countries 
and their competing claims to jurisdiction.  
Again, this domestic paradigm can be discovered not only in case 
law, but also in reformist literature, which does not transcend the para-
digm. Berman’s main test for the adequacy of asserting jurisdiction—
whether a defendant is “a member” of the community that asserts juris-
diction124—provides one example. Another example is Evan Tsen Lee’s 
recent proposal to view jurisdictional questions as similar to questions 
on the merits, because both are about the legitimacy of a resulting judg-
ment.125 Since questions on the merits are undoubtedly domestic matters 
(provided domestic law applies), this proposal makes sense only if juris-
diction is likewise understood as domestic126 and the legitimacy question 
underlying jurisdiction concerns the relation to domestic society rather 
than to foreign courts.127 
Fourth, U.S. jurisdictional theories are political. Jurisdiction in the 
United States, since it focuses on the relationship between the parties 
and the court, is a political issue. Since the exercise of jurisdiction is 
                                                                                                                                 
 123. Id. at 486. 
 124. Berman, supra note 120, at 487–88. 
 125. Lee, supra note 106, at 1620. Lee’s point that even the power theory is really about 
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viewed along a vertical dimension as a public intrusion into the 
defendant’s freedom, the individual has a negative right to be free from 
state intervention unless this intervention is justified. This is why 
justification for jurisdiction often occurs with reference to political 
philosophers dealing with the justification for governmental authority, be 
they Hobbes and Locke128 or Rawls, Hart, and Nozick.129 Since these 
philosophers’ theories all focus on the vertical relation between 
government and citizens, they translate well into jurisdiction; the court 
represents the government and the defendant represents the governed.130 
What the theories do not address are relations to other states. For exam-
ple, a Lockean fairness theory of jurisdiction can explain jurisdiction 
over non-citizens, but it has little space for horizontal relations with 
other states’ courts.131 For Locke, the assertion of jurisdiction over for-
eigners was based on the foreigner’s implied submission, not on any 
comity granted by the foreigner’s home state. In this sense, the political 
justification remains domestic. The reason may be that, in matters of 
private litigation, the respective interests of states in exercising jurisdic-
tion are minimal;132 what matters politically is the power exercised over 
the parties. 
3. Subsumption and Externalization of  
Competing Considerations 
Of course, this is not the whole picture. No one can seriously say 
that U.S. law focuses only on the relations between the court and the 
defendant or the dispute and not at all on the relations to other states. 
Relations to other states are considered within the due process test for 
jurisdiction and they are considered through several other legal 
mechanisms. However, these exceptions strengthen rather than weaken 
the thesis that U.S. jurisdictional law remains in a vertical, unilateral, 
domestic, political paradigm. When multilateral considerations become 
relevant within the due process test, they are subsumed within the 
domestic paradigm that the Due Process Clause encompasses. Further, 
because the multilateral function of allocation between different states is 
                                                                                                                                 
 128. See Roger H. Transgrud, The Federal Common Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 57 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 849, 892–93 (1989); Richard B. Cappalli, Locke as the Key: A Unifying 
and Coherent Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 43 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 97, 101 (1992); 
Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 276, 301, 306; von Mehren, supra note 10, at 31–33. 
 129. Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 305, 307. 
 130. Cappalli, supra note 128, at 101. 
 131. von Mehren, supra note 10, at 35; Cf. John Locke, Two Treatises of Govern-
ment II §§ 119–22 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1689) (justifying 
jurisdiction over non-citizens with the non-citizens’ tacit consent). 
 132. Martin H. Redish, Due Process, Federalism and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoreti-
cal Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1112, 1132 (1981). 
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externalized—fulfilled by other, functionally equivalent, institutions—
the law of jurisdiction can remain largely oblivious to these 
considerations. 
First, the Due Process Clause is also used for multilateral 
considerations, especially for interstate cases in the context of 
federalism. The reasonableness prong of the due process test emphasizes 
“the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient 
resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States 
in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”133 The U.S. 
Supreme Court appeared to think multilaterally when it pointed out, in 
World-Wide Volkswagen, that “[t]he sovereignty of each State, in turn, 
implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its sister States—a limi-
tation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution 
and the Fourteenth Amendment.”134 The passage is frequently invoked in 
support of an allocational theory of jurisdiction. 
These considerations cannot be explained through reference to the 
relationship between the court and the defendant, and have therefore 
been criticized as irrelevant for the Due Process Clause.135 They represent 
the horizontal relation between states.136 However, it is by no means ir-
relevant that the locus of these limitations is not the “scheme” of the 
Constitution but ultimately “the Due Process Clause, acting as an in-
strument of interstate federalism, which may sometimes act to divest the 
State of its power to render a valid judgment.”137 Multilateral effects of 
allocation of jurisdiction are not prime goals but mere reflective conse-
quences of unilateral considerations. They are subsumed: “[t]he 
restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function of the individual 
liberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause;”138 “[d]ue process 
protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally.”139 
Federalism is used as an argument that some restrictions on jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                 
 133. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980). 
 134. 444 U.S. at 293. 
 135. See Redish, supra note 132; Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Three Deaths of “State Sov-
ereignty” and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 699, 739–40 (1983). 
 136. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 228. 
 137. Id. at 294. 
 138. Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). 
 139. Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 711 (1987); cf. Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 271 (“In 
personal jurisdiction, it is the individual’s right to be left alone by a state that has no legitimate 
authority over him or her that the due process clause protects.”). 
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are necessary in a federal system, but the source for these restrictions is 
the Due Process Clause. 
It is of course true that multilateral considerations of federalism 
were crucial for early American law on jurisdiction. But they were so in 
a very peculiar way: in many of the old leading cases, for example 
D’Arcy v. Ketchum,140 jurisdiction became relevant only indirectly, as a 
requirement for enforcement under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.141 At 
stake was not whether the assertion of jurisdiction itself by those courts 
violated the Constitution, but rather whether a state had to give full faith 
and credit to decisions rendered by the courts of another state without 
jurisdiction. Restraints on jurisdiction were therefore only indirect.142 
The same is true for specific restrictions of jurisdiction in individual 
areas of the law—such as divorce, property, or penal law.143 Restrictions 
on direct jurisdiction, by contrast, are not based on the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, where they would belong if they were primarily about 
multilateral, allocational issues.144 Rather, they are based on the unilateral 
Due Process Clause, where federalism issues become relevant only 
implicitly.  
That the “scheme” of the Constitution does not provide a proper 
source for explicit multilateral considerations becomes even clearer in 
view of case law on international cases. The U.S. Supreme Court uses 
almost exactly the same approach for international cases that it has de-
veloped for domestic interstate cases, although constitutional limitations 
derived from federalism should be irrelevant where a potential conflict 
                                                                                                                                 
 140. 52 U.S. 165 (1850). 
 141. See Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction: 
A Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
Clauses (Part One), 14 Creighton L. Rev. 499 (1981). 
 142. Scoles et al., supra note 9. On the difference between direct and indirect jurisdic-
tion, see Arthur Nussbaum, Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments, 41 Colum. L. Rev. 221 
(1941); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1601, 1610–36 
(1968); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments—General 
Theory and the Role of Jurisdictional Requirements, in 167 Recueil des Cours 9 (1980); 
Ralf Michaels, Some Jurisdictional Conceptions as Applied in Judgments Conventions, in 
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World, supra note 46, part II.1, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=927484. 
 143. Cf. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 225–26, 227 (finding a distinction between jurisdic-
tion at the decision stage and at the recognition stage “inimical to a rational system of 
interstate justice”). Such a distinction, although not always well recognized in the interstate 
context, is crucial especially in the international context, in which different countries’ ap-
proaches to jurisdiction may differ widely. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1126–27 (1966). 
See Weinstein, supra, note 78, at 258–64. 
 144. Robert Abrams & Paul Dimond, Toward a Constitutional Framework for the Con-
trol of State Court Jurisdiction, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 75 (1984); Transgrud, supra note 128, at 
880–84 (1989). 
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of jurisdictions is with another country. Nonetheless, proposals to abol-
ish or at least seriously restrict constitutional control of jurisdiction in 
international settings145 have remained unheeded. The only possible con-
clusion is that the constitutional setting of allocation cannot be what 
drives constitutional restrictions on jurisdiction. 
Critics argue that the need to explain restrictions to jurisdiction with 
reference to the protection of individual rights hampers the development 
of principles addressing more specifically the concerns of federalism and 
of interstate and international allocation of jurisdiction.146 They ask the 
courts to base allocational federalist concerns in jurisdiction on other 
foundations, either the general structure of the Constitution, federal 
common law,147 or more detailed rules of state law.148 Such changes in the 
law of jurisdiction are less urgent once it becomes clear that these con-
siderations are already taken care of, albeit in different ways—they are 
externalized from the law of in personam jurisdiction to other areas of 
the law. Through externalization, the U.S. legal system can 
simultaneously account for the necessities of multilateralism and yet 
keep the law of jurisdiction free of them so its jurisdictional paradigm 
remains internally consistent. 
One kind of externalization takes place through the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens.149 The private and public factors in the forum non 
conveniens test are so similar to those in the due process test that some 
have questioned the necessity of two separate tests.150 But forum non 
conveniens differs from due process in one important respect: it requires 
a comparison of the relative convenience of several available fora.151 A 
                                                                                                                                 
 145. Andrew L. Strauss, Where America Ends and the International Order Begins: In-
terpreting the Jurisdictional Reach of the U.S. Constitution in Light of a Proposed Hague 
Convention on Jurisdiction and Satisfaction of Judgments, 61 Alb. L. Rev. 1237 (1998); 
Wendy Perdue, Aliens, the Internet, and “Purposeful Availment”: A Reassessment of Fifth 
Amendment Limits on Personal Jurisdiction, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 455 (2004); see also Austen 
L. Parrish, Sovereignty, not Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction over Nonresident Alien Defen-
dants, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 56–59 (2006) (suggesting abolishing constitutional 
constraints on personal jurisdiction over aliens and replacing them with constraints from com-
ity).  
 146. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 270–76. 
 147. See generally Weinstein, supra note 78; Whitten, supra note 141. 
 148. Clermont, supra note 49, at 110–12. 
 149. Under this doctrine, a court can decide not to exercise jurisdiction if it finds itself to 
be an inappropriate forum and if there is a clearly more appropriate forum elsewhere. 
 150. Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doc-
trine, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 781 (1985); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A 
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259 (1987); Kevin M. Clermont, Territo-
rial Jurisdiction and Venue 43 (1999); see also Chase, Law, Culture, and Ritual, 
supra note 52, at 80. 
 151. Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 493–94. Given how insufficient the analysis of an 
alternative forum often is, and how rarely suits are brought again at an alternative forum after 
a forum non conveniens dismissal, one could argue that not even forum non conveniens in U.S. 
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court will declare itself a forum non conveniens only if another forum is 
both available and clearly more appropriate. Functionally, the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens can be viewed as a jurisdictional device; to 
determine whether a court should hear a case or not is at its heart a 
decision about jurisdiction and its exercise. It is therefore significant 
that, doctrinally, forum non conveniens is a matter different from 
jurisdiction.152 Dismissal on the basis of forum non conveniens is 
available only if a court otherwise has jurisdiction;153 it is a matter of 
discretion and does not create res judicata. By externalizing multilateral 
considerations to a doctrine outside of jurisdiction, the U.S. law of 
jurisdiction can maintain its unilateral posture.154 Whether the alternative 
forum provides a real alternative for the plaintiff is not an issue 
American courts address in detail, and few cases dismissed with regard 
to another forum are later brought at that forum.155 But this only suggests 
that the foreign forum is less attractive than the one where the suit was 
first brought; it does not suggest that multilateral considerations are not 
taken seriously.156 
A second externalization of multilateral consideration takes place 
through the foreign affairs power. In Asahi Metal v. Superior Court of 
California, the Supreme Court invoked “the federal interest in Govern-
ment’s foreign relations policies” as a relevant consideration when 
asking whether exercising jurisdiction would be reasonable.157 Interna-
tional concerns are therefore present in the analysis. At the same time, 
however, deference in multilateral issues to the executive branch ensures 
that the Court remains in a domestic, not international, paradigm. The 
issue is addressed not as one of allocation of power between one country 
                                                                                                                      
law is not a truly multilateral doctrine. In an unpublished empirical study, Christopher A. 
Whytock finds that in his sample of cases since 1990, in an estimated forty-one percent of 
forum non conveniens cases, including eighteen percent of forum non conveniens dismissals, 
the court engaged in no adequate alternative forum analysis. However, the fact that courts do 
not perform their multilateral tasks well has no impact on the fact that this task is multilateral. 
 152. For English law, see Fentiman, supra note 25, at 86. 
 153. This proposition is accurate, at least according to Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 
U.S. 501, 504 (1947). The U.S. Supreme Court will review this question in Sinochem Int’l Co. 
Ltd. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., No. 06-102. 
 154. By dismissing a case on condition or stipulation, a court can try to guarantee that 
the more appropriate forum will hear the case and thereby reach an effect very similar to that 
of transfer. In the majority of cases, however, an action dismissed by one forum under the 
doctrine of forum non conveniens is not brought again before another court. For empirical 
data, see D. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic 
Fiction”, 103 L.Q. Rev. 398, 419 (1987). 
 155. Burbank, supra note 24, at 242–43; Martin Davies, Time to Change the Federal 
Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 346–48 (2002). 
 156. See Russell W. Weintraub, Response to Professor Robertson, 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. 
381, 381 (1994); see also supra note 154. 
 157. 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987). 
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and another (as it would be in an international paradigm), but rather as 
one of allocation of power between the judiciary and the executive. In-
ternational considerations are for the government; domestic 
considerations remain with the courts. 
Finally, a third important externalization involves the law of 
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions. In the interstate 
system, horizontal considerations can be ignored at the stage of 
jurisdiction because they become relevant at the stage of recognition. It 
is significant in this regard that, apart from fraud, lack of jurisdiction in 
the rendering court is the only relevant exception to the constitutional 
requirement to give full faith and credit to other states’ judgments.158 
Likewise, in the international realm, foreign nation judgments are denied 
recognition for lack of jurisdiction of the rendering court, which includes 
not only jurisdiction under that court’s own law, but also (and more 
importantly for purposes of this Article) lack of jurisdiction under U.S. 
due process standards.159 In fact, the requirements for recognition 
purposes can be even stricter than those proposed for jurisdiction of U.S. 
courts.160 Although this is an imperfect substitute for restricting 
jurisdiction at the time of the first decision (because a non-recognizable 
decision remains enforceable in the country where it was rendered), for a 
unilateral paradigm it has the advantage that multilateral considerations 
come into play at the moment when the judgment’s effects become 
multilateral, because the judgment is taken into another state for 
recognition purposes. Considering multilateral issues of jurisdiction at 
the recognition stage makes it easier to neglect multilateral 
considerations at the decision stage. 
B. “Us or Them”—The European Paradigm of Jurisdiction 
European thinking about jurisdiction is strikingly different. This can 
be said as a general statement, even though European countries have dif-
                                                                                                                                 
 158. See discussion in Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 1284–88. Cf. Weintraub, supra 
note 14, at 123 (“The defendant can make this attack [of lack of jurisdiction] either in the state 
in which the judgment has been rendered or in a sister state.”); see id. at 123–24 for the differ-
ent situation under EU law, where a collateral effect is not possible. 
 159. See the references in Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in 
United States Courts 969–71 (3d ed. 1996); Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments: Analysis and Proposed Federal Statute—Proposed Final Draft § 6, at 14 (April 
11, 2005) [hereinafter ALI Judgments Statute]. For analysis, see Michaels, supra note 142; 
Conflict of Laws in a Globalizing World: A Tribute to Arthur von Mehren, 
(Eckart Gottschalk, Ralf Michaels, Giesela Rühl & Jan von Hein eds., forthcoming 2007). 
 160. See ALI Judgments Statute, supra note 159, at 85, 87. 
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ferent laws of jurisdiction.161 European legislation, notably the Brussels 
Regulation, brought a unified law of jurisdiction within Europe and a 
somewhat unified theory, but only to a limited degree. Nonetheless, the 
Brussels Regulation can be considered representative of European law 
for two reasons. First, it incorporates and therefore represents much ju-
risdictional thinking from the member states. Second, in its focus on 
relations between member states, rather than relations to third countries, 
it is most comparable to U.S. law, which developed largely in an inter-
state setting. Of course, national laws on jurisdiction remain important, 
as inspiration for the Brussels Regime and as representations of Euro-
pean thinking. 
1. European Thinking About Jurisdiction 
Any comparison of American and European thinking about jurisdic-
tion faces an immediate problem: European jurisdictional thinking was 
for a long time less theoretical than American thinking.162 One could 
therefore attempt simply to use the triad of theories developed in the 
American context, relational/sovereignty, power, and interest theories, on 
European law as well. To some extent, relational theories can be used to 
explain jurisdiction based on domicile and habitual residence, as in Arti-
cle 2 of the Brussels Regulation, and jurisdiction based on nationality, as 
in Articles 14 and 15 of the French Code Civil, which give jurisdiction to 
French courts based on the French nationality of the plaintiff or the de-
fendant.163 Power and sovereignty theories seem even more appropriate 
to explain these French bases: jurisdiction is based on the sovereign 
power of the French nation-state over its citizens.164 Power has also been 
used to explain Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, which 
gives courts general jurisdiction based on the presence of assets of the 
defendant.165 Fairness and convenience theories can go a long way  
                                                                                                                                 
 161. English law, with its common law tradition, differs fundamentally from continental 
law; in many (though not all) regards, it is closer to the U.S. paradigm than the European 
paradigm. 
 162. For the German approach, see von Mehren, supra note 10, at 143. This relative lack 
of theoretical accounts is in accordance with the apolitical character this Article claims for the 
European paradigm; infra Part III.B.2. Where the assertion of jurisdiction is largely viewed as 
a neutral and technical matter, theories for its justification are unnecessary. 
 163. For such an explanation, see id. at 186–88; for an analysis of Article 14 of the Code 
Civil from a U.S. perspective, see Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20; for a pertinent decision 
affecting a U.S. party, see Cass. Civ., Mar. 30, 2004, supra note 67 (rejecting enforcement of a 
U.S. judgment against a French woman who had not waived her privilege under Code Civil 
Article 14 to be sued only in France). 
 164. Étienne Pataut, Principe de Souveraineté et Conflits de Jurisdictions 
(Étude de Droit International Privé) 95 (1999). 
 165. Rudolf Waizenegger, Der Gerichtsstand des § 23 ZPO und seine gesetzli-
che Entwicklung 100–01 (1915); Pfeiffer, supra, note 110, at 204; but cf. von Mehren, 
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towards explaining many bases of specific jurisdiction. Especially in 
Germany, there has long been a focus on private interests as factors in 
designating competent fora;166 scholars and courts also emphasize private 
interests at work in the Brussels Regulation.167 
Yet, Europeans rarely use these American theories,168 and indeed 
they do not accurately explain European law. First, there is a difference 
in emphasis. American comparatists, applying the theories to European 
jurisdictional law, often focus on provisions that may look central 
through the lens of the theories but appear peripheral to European ana-
lysts and practice. For example, although Article 23 of the German Code 
of Procedure is a regular focus of American analysis (and outrage), the 
provision plays a relatively modest role in German jurisdictional prac-
tice;169 the same is true for Articles 14 and 15 of the French Code Civil.170 
Second, none of the theories can adequately explain current European 
law. In particular, the principle that plaintiffs normally seek out defen-
dants, which is central to European jurisdictional thinking171 and codified 
in Article 2 of the Brussels Regulation, cannot be explained by any of 
these theories, as von Mehren has shown.172 Relational theories could 
focus on plaintiffs or defendants equally well, as the French Code Civil 
makes clear: Article 14 gives jurisdiction to French plaintiffs, and Article 
                                                                                                                      
supra note 10, at 145 n.377 (“Section 23 is less consistent than its pre-1871 precursors with a 
power theory.”). 
 166. See Andreas Heldrich, Internationale Zuständigkeit und Anwendbares 
Recht 102–31 (1969); Jochen Schröder, Internationale Zuständigkeit: Entwurf 
eines Systems von Zuständigkeitsinteressen im zwischenstaatlichen 
Privatverfahrensrecht aufgrund rechsthistorischer, rechtsvergleichender und 
rechtspolitischer Betrachtungen 112–485 (1971) (extensive comparative and historical 
analysis); Haimo Schack, Internationales Zivilverfahrensrecht: ein Studienbuch 
93–94, nos. 200–04 (3d ed. 2002). 
 167. Infra Parts IV.A, IV.D. 
 168. Exceptions are usually influenced by U.S. law. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, supra note 110, 
at 200–13; Till U. Kleinstück, Due Process-Beschränkungen des Vermögens-
gerichtsstandes durch hinreichenden Inlandsbezug und Minimum Contacts 166–88 
(1994). 
 169. Contra Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 8 (“Since the legislator created this provision 
with a view to cases with international focus, it is of exemplary relevance for the whole law of 
jurisdiction.”) (Ralf Michaels trans.). The opposite seems more plausible: since the provision 
was conceived as an exception to the analogous application of venue provisions for matters of 
jurisdiction, Article 23 cannot be considered representative. Moreover, Pfeiffer’s own conclu-
sion that Article 23 violates the German Constitution, id. at 620–23, reinforces its exceptional 
character. 
 170. See Clermont & Palmer, supra note 20, at 492 (“In fact, Article 14 appears not to be 
regularly invoked in practice.”). 
 171. Supra note 87. 
 172. von Mehren, supra note 10, at 185–91; Arthur T. von Mehren, Must Plaintiffs Seek 
Out Defendants? The Contemporary Standing of Actor Sequitur Forum Rei, 8 King’s Coll. 
L.J. 23 (1997–98); see also Benedikt Buchner, Kläger- und Beklagtenschutz im 
Recht der internationalen Zuständigkeit passim (1998). 
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15 gives jurisdiction over French defendants. Each provision rests on 
relational considerations; there is no intrinsic reason why a relational 
theory should focus only on defendants.173 Similarly, power theories do 
not systematically favor defendants’ fora; they can justify the existence 
of a number of different courts with jurisdiction.174 Fairness theories, fi-
nally, cannot explain why defendants should be preferred over 
plaintiffs.175 That none of these theories can explain a central element of 
European jurisdictional thinking suggests that they are inadequate. 
Moreover, given that these theories furnish all the reasonable answers 
that have been advanced in response to the fundamental question of ju-
risdiction as understood in the United States—when is it appropriate vis-
à-vis the defendant for a court to exercise jurisdiction over him—it is 
plausible that the questions to which European law responds differ alto-
gether from those posed in the United States. 
Europeans do indeed ask different questions. To understand how dif-
ferent, it is instructive to look at the roots of German jurisdictional law 
as one important source of European jurisdictional thinking.176 In Ger-
many, the law of jurisdiction—internationale Zuständigkeit 
(international competence)—was derived from the law of venue—
örtliche Zuständigkeit (local competence).177 For a long time, the highest 
German court, the Reichsgericht, did not even distinguish between these 
forms of competence, but rather treated them both as issues of venue.178 
A differentiation between international jurisdiction and venue developed 
only slowly; still today most rules on international jurisdiction are de-
rived from the rules on venue. Significantly, the author of one of the 
official reports on the Brussels Convention speaks of “international 
venue”—because calling them provisions of jurisdiction would falsely 
suggest similarity to American ideas of jurisdiction—and points out that 
                                                                                                                                 
 173. von Mehren, supra note 10, at 188. 
 174. See id. at 189; see also Schlosser, supra note 17, at 19 (“Justice Holmes’ ‘power 
concept’ as the basis of jurisdiction is alien to civil-law systems.”) (internal reference omitted). 
 175. See von Mehren, supra note 10, at 191 (citing Int’l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945)). Note that this Article, in focusing on paradigms, is concerned with jurisdictional 
thinking rather than practical results; supra Part C.1. Whether in practice most suits must be 
brought at the defendant’s forum is a different question; for this question, see von Mehren, 
supra note 10, at 191–94. 
 176. French law, which once focused more on sovereignty concerns, has moved closer to 
this German model as well. See Hubert Bauer, Compétence Judiciaire Internationale 
des Tribunaux Civils Français et Allemands passim (1965). 
 177. See Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 73–77; Peter L. Murray & Rolf Stürner, 
German Civil Justice (2004). 
 178. E.g. 8 Otto Warneyer, Die Rechtsprechung des Reichsgerichts, No. 247, at 
376–77 (1915) (“There is no intrinsic reason to distinguish between the case in which the 
venue of a foreign court besides that of a German court is at stake and the case in which the 
choice must be struck between German courts.”) (Ralf Michaels trans.). 
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Europeans do not typically distinguish between jurisdiction and interna-
tional venue.179 As a consequence, considerations on jurisdiction are 
largely similar to those for venue. In fact, although Americans have also 
suggested such a similarity, a comparison with American proposals to 
merge jurisdiction and venue reveals the degree of difference between 
jurisdiction in Germany and jurisdiction in the United States: while some 
Americans are willing to treat venue like jurisdiction,180 Europeans 
would rather treat jurisdiction like venue. Jurisdiction in the American 
sense has an altogether different doctrinal counterpart in German law, 
Gerichtsbarkeit. Gerichtsbarkeit, the origin of which is in international 
rather than national law, defines the outer limits of the power of one 
country’s courts and is separate from international venue.181 Gerichts-
barkeit concerns mainly questions of immunity, and its practical 
importance beyond this is not nearly as great as that of jurisdiction in the 
United States.182 
This foundation of jurisdiction in venue is overlooked by American 
(and German) comparatists who consider only those provisions in Ger-
man law most amenable to their own paradigm. For example, Article 23 
of the German Code of Civil Procedure (quasi in rem jurisdiction) stands 
out because it deals explicitly with international cases, but its role within 
German law of jurisdiction is by no means prominent.183 
The Brussels Regulation, not surprisingly, continues in many ways 
the approaches found in the jurisdictional systems of the EU member 
states.184 In this way, it can be called a civil law instrument,185 although 
here, as in other areas of the law, the distinction between civil law and 
common law is too abstract to be very helpful.186 Significantly, in the 
                                                                                                                                 
 179. Schlosser, supra note 17, at 19–20. See Nussbaum, supra note 142, at 221–22.  
 180. Spencer Weber Waller, A Unified Theory of Transnational Procedure, 26 Cornell 
Int’l L.J. 101 (1993); see also Clermont, supra note 14, at 27–29. 
 181. See, e.g., Schack, supra note 166, at 64–80; the foundational article is Max 
Pagenstecher, Gerichtsbarkeit und interationale Zuständigkeit als selbständige 
Prozeßvoraussetzungen, 11 RabelsZ 337 (1937). See also Robert Neuner, Internatio-
nale Zuständigkeit (1929). 
 182. But see Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (federal constitutional court) Feb 16, 
2006, 2 BvR 1476/03, 59 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2542 (2006) (denying 
enforcement for lack of Gerichtsbarkeit to a Greek judgment on reparation claims by Greek 
victims resulting from the German occupation of Crete in World War II); Markus Rau, State 
Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law—The Distomo Case Before the 
German Federal Constitutional Court, 7 German L.J. 701, 705–07 (2006). 
 183. Contra Pfeiffer, supra note 110, at 8.  
 184. See Schlosser, supra note 17, at 30. 
 185. Anna Gardella & Luca G. Radicati di Brozolo, Civil Law, Common Law and Mar-
ket Integration: The EC Approach to Conflicts of Jurisdiction, 51 Am. J. Comp. L. 611, 612–16 
(2003). 
 186. See David A.O. Edward, The Role and Relevance of the Civil Law Tradition in the 
Work of the European Court of Justice, in The Civilian Tradition and Scots Law 309, 
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Regulation’s predecessor, the 1968 Brussels Convention, the term “juris-
diction” was not used in any of the official languages;187 it only appeared 
in the later English version when the United Kingdom joined in 1979. 
Indeed, the concept of jurisdiction in the Brussels Regulation is more 
similar to the German law of venue than to jurisdiction in the American 
sense.
188
 Notably, most provisions of the Regulation simultaneously regu-
late venue within the member states189—as in Germany, venue and 
jurisdiction are not distinguished. On the other hand, jurisdiction in the 
sense of Gerichtsbarkeit is left outside the scope of the Regulation alto-
gether.190 
The main objective of both German law and the Brussels Regulation 
is not to protect defendants but rather to allocate jurisdiction to the most 
appropriate member state, regardless of sovereignty interests of the 
member states. Defendants domiciled in a member state can always be 
sued in their home states (Article 2), and there are specific grounds for 
jurisdiction in Articles 5 et seq. Importantly, each of these specific provi-
sions determines only one relevant factor and therefore renders only one 
state’s courts competent. For example, specific jurisdiction for contracts 
could, in theory, lie at the place where the contract is made, the place 
where the contract is performed, or both. Yet, whereas under U.S. law 
this means that both places can in fact claim specific jurisdiction,191 
European law searches for one and only one connecting factor for each 
legal category; in the case of contracts, this is the place of performance 
(Article 5(1)).192 The only exception is jurisdiction over torts, which lies 
                                                                                                                      
311–15 (David L. Carey Miller & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 1997) (denying a specific civil 
law influence on the European Court of Justice case law regarding the Brussels Convention). 
 187. The original text was passed in four official languages, none of which used the term 
jurisdiction or its foreign language equivalent: German (Zuständigkeit), French (compétence 
judiciaire), Italian (competenza giurisdizionale), and Dutch (rechterlijke bevoegdheid). The 
German president of the expert group that developed the Convention unsuccessfully proposed 
the term Jurisdiktion: Arthur Bülow, Vereinheitlichtes Internationales Zivilprozessrecht in der 
Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, 29 RabelsZ 473, 478 n. 15 (1965); see also 
Reinhold Geimer, Zur Prüfung der Gerichtsbarkeit und der internationalen 
Zuständigkeit bei der Anerkennung ausländischer Urteile 71 (1966). 
 188. Jan Kropholler, Internationale Zuständigkeit, in I Handbuch des Internatio-
nalen Zivilverfahrensrechts 197 (Tübingen, Mohr, 1982). 
 189. Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 5, 6 [hereinafter Jenard Report]; Report on 
the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters and to the Protocol on its Inter-
pretation by the Court of Justice, 1979 O.J. (C 59) 71, para. 70 [hereinafter Schlosser Report]. 
 190. Jan Kropholler, Europäisches Zivilprozeßrecht, art. 2, no. 4, at 95 (8th ed. 
2005). 
 191. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 479 (1985); Scoles et al., supra 
note 9, at 389 (“no single factor can be dispositive”). 
 192. See Case C-256/00, Besix v. WABAG, 2002 E.C.R. I-1699, paras. 29, 32. 
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both at the place of conduct and at the place of injury,193 but this is a mat-
ter of interpretation of “place of the tort,” not an endorsement of 
alternative factors. 
In contrast to U.S. law, the Brussels Regulation distinguishes be-
tween intra-Community cases and cases involving contacts with non-
member states. Its provisions apply to plaintiffs from non-member 
states194 but not normally to defendants from non-member states;195 
against the latter, national provisions on jurisdiction remain applicable. 
Given how important this restriction is, and how heavily it has been 
criticized in the United States,196 it is surprising to see how little thought 
was apparently given to it when the Convention was drafted.197 The 
original reason for the restriction lay in the limited competence of the 
EU at the time;198 now that this argument has lost some of its force, con-
temporary scholars are widely critical of the restriction.199 The main 
justification given today is the pressure the restriction places on foreign 
countries like the United States to compromise on their own wide claims 
to jurisdiction or ensure enforcement of European decisions.200 That 
Europeans consider the Regulation a good model for a worldwide con-
                                                                                                                                 
 193. Case 21/76, Handelskwekerij G.J. Bier BV v. Mines de Potasse d’Alsace SA, 1976 
E.C.R. 1735; Case C- 51/97, Réunion Européenne SA v. Spliethoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor BV, 
1998 E.C.R. I-6513.  
 194. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000 
E.C.R. I-5925. 
 195. E.g., Case C-318/93, Brenner v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 1994 E.C.R. I-4275. 
For a general analysis, see George Berman & Bernard Audit, The Application of Private Inter-
national Norms to “Third Countries”: The Jurisdiction and Judgments Example, in 
International Civil Litigation in Europe and Relations With Third States, supra 
note 25, at 65–68. 
 196. See Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: 
Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community 
and the United States, 81 Colum. L. Rev. 1044, 1058–59 (1981) (directly juxtaposing the 
nondiscriminatory Due Process Clause in the United States and the discriminatory provision 
in Article 3 of the Brussels I regime); see also Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper 
Fora in Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 
995 (1967); see also Friedrich Juenger, Judicial Jurisdiction in the United States and in the 
European Communities: A Comparison, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1195, 1211–12 (1984); for due 
process concerns, see Ronald A. Brand, Hague Judgments Convention, supra note 19, at 696–
701. 
 197. See the very brief remarks by Bülow, supra note 187, at 482–83; see also Martha 
Weser, Convention communautaire sur la competence judiciare et l’exécution des 
décisions 274–77 (1975). 
 198. Georges Droz, Compétence judiciaire et effets des jugements dans le 
marché commun (1972). 
 199. E.g., Kropholler, supra note 190, art. 4, para. 1, at 107; Pascal Grolimund, 
Drittstaatenproblematik des europäischen Zivilverfahrensrechts 273–74 (2000).  
 200. Reinhold Geimer, Internationales Zivilprozeßrecht § 1383, at 436 (4th ed. 
2001); Schack, supra note 166, at 46, no. 103.  
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vention201 shows they do not regard its content as unique to intra-
Community relations, just as the constitutional law of jurisdiction in the 
United States is not considered unique to intrastate relations. 
2. A Horizontal, Multilateral, International, Apolitical Paradigm 
Underlying both European practice and theory of jurisdiction is a 
paradigm very different from that in the United States. First, this para-
digm is horizontal. European jurisdictional thinking focuses on the 
horizontal relations between countries rather than on the vertical relation 
between the court and the parties. This peculiarity is touched on, but not 
really captured, when comparatists argue that Europeans care less about 
contacts to the defendant and more about contacts to the controversy. 
This latter distinction, one of degree rather than of paradigm, does not 
explain well general jurisdiction in Europe at the defendant’s domicile 
regardless of the controversy.202 It seems similarly inadequate in explain-
ing specific jurisdiction in U.S. law, which requires a close connection 
between the forum and the controversy.203 Rather, the real question of 
jurisdiction in Europe is neither whether there are sufficient vertical con-
tacts between the defendant and the country whose courts are seized, nor 
whether such contacts exist between that country and the controversy. 
The real question is which of several states’ courts are the most appro-
priate to deal with a type of litigation. Jurisdiction is justified vis-à-vis 
other states with a plausible claim to jurisdiction, not vis-à-vis the de-
fendant and her interest in protection from the court. 
Second, jurisdictional thinking in the European tradition is multilat-
eral. Of course, jurisdictional rules outside of conventions are 
necessarily unilateral in effect in the sense that a court can only deter-
mine whether it has jurisdiction or not; it cannot designate a foreign 
court as competent.204 Even in national laws, however, jurisdiction is  
                                                                                                                                 
 201. Schlosser supra note 17, at 10 (“From the outset, there was a common understand-
ing that the system of the Brussels Convention must be the starting point . . . .”); Schack, 
supra note 166. For American criticism, see Arthur T. von Mehren, The Hague Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Convention Project Faces an Impasse—A Diagnosis and Guidelines for a 
Cure, 20 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts [IPRax] 465 
(2000); Arthur T. von Mehren & Ralf Michaels, Pragmatismus und Realismus für die Haager 
Verhandlungen zu einem weltweiten Gerichtsstands- und Vollstreckungsübereinkommen, 25 
DAJV-Newsletter 124, 126 (2000) (F.R.G.); see also Conclusions of the second Special 
Commission meeting on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and 
commercial matters, in Proceedings of the Eighteenth Session, supra note 33, at 185. 
 202. See Haimo Schack, Germany, in Declining Jurisdiction in Private Interna-
tional Law 189, 194 (J.J. Fawcett ed., 1995). 
 203. For an explanation of the concept of specific jurisdiction, see von Mehren, supra 
note 142, at 64–65. 
 204. This represents a difference from choice of law, where foreign law can be applied. 
Unlike jurisdictional rules, choice of law rules can be truly multilateral if they use the same 
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allocated according to principles that are at least potentially universal. 
For German law, this is a natural consequence of its roots in the law of 
venue: venue rules must be universal because they allocate venue to one 
of several courts; extension of these principles is therefore also universal 
at least in attitude. But the connection is not confined to Germany. Au-
thors in the French tradition also claim a multilateral character for their 
laws of jurisdiction. The use of universal connecting factors implies that 
if the factor (e.g. the defendant’s domicile) lies outside the state, the state 
does not have jurisdiction.205 In this view, jurisdiction cannot be denied 
for any reason other than that another more appropriate forum has juris-
diction.206 
The multilateral character of jurisdiction in Europe becomes clear 
once we realize that the criterion for jurisdiction is not a close connec-
tion, as in U.S. law, but rather the closest connection in an abstractly 
defined category like tort and according to an abstractly defined connect-
ing factor like “place of the tort.” Determining the closest connection 
requires a horizontal comparison between the connections that different 
countries have with the parties or the dispute. Consequently, the main 
criterion is not the vertical relation between the state and the defendant 
but rather the horizontal relation between the court’s own state and other 
states, not fairness towards the defendant but appropriateness vis-à-vis 
other countries’ claims of jurisdiction. Of course, different bases of ju-
risdiction are available at the same time, and no decision is made 
regarding which of them constitutes the closest connection. In a con-
tracts case, for example, the plaintiff can sue the defendant both in the 
defendant’s home country207 and at the place of performance.208 Forum 
shopping is possible in Europe, too, and although it is sometimes 
frowned upon,209 lawyers recognize that it is both unavoidable and unob-
jectionable in principle.210 The point is that only one place of jurisdiction 
is sought within each category. 
                                                                                                                      
factors for the application of forum law and of foreign law. See Jan Kropholler, Interna-
tionales Privatrecht 565 (4th ed. 2001). 
 205. Weser, supra note 197, at 36–38. 
 206. Id. at 38. 
 207. Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 2; ZPO, supra note 21, art. 13. 
 208. Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 5(1); ZPO, supra note 21, art. 29. 
 209. See Case C-334/00, Fonderie Officine Meccaniche Tacconi SpA v. Heinrich Wagner 
Sinto Maschinenfabrik GmbH, 2002 E.C.R. I-7357, Op. Advocate Gen. Geelhoed para. 32. 
(Jan. 31, 2001); see also Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, Op. Advo-
cate Gen. Léger paras. 34, 50 (Jan. 14, 2004). 
 210. Case C-1/04, Staubitz-Schreiber, 2005 E.C.R. I-701, Op. Advocate Gen. Ruiz-
Jarabo Colomer para. 71 (Sept. 6, 2005); Case C-343/04, Land Oberösterreich v. ČEZ, 2006 
E.C.R. 1-4557, Op. Advocate Gen. Poiares Maduro para. 85 (Jan. 11, 2006); Schack, supra 
note 166, at 100, no. 222. In fact, the EU Commission itself engages in forum shopping when 
it sues tobacco companies before U.S. courts in the hope of getting treble damages under 
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Third, European jurisdictional thinking is international. While the 
question in a domestic paradigm was whether the dispute or the parties 
are “in or out” of the jurisdiction, here the jurisdictional question is 
whether it is for “us or them” to exercise jurisdiction.” “International” 
does not refer to the character of the Brussels Regulation as an interna-
tional treaty211 or to the fact that the Regulation still applies 
internationally to several nation states. Rather, “international” signifies 
that what matters is the relation between nations. Jurisdiction can be 
based on a hypothetical common understanding between countries, a 
matter of international law. Jurisdictional rules are, at least potentially, 
universal. There is an obvious parallel to choice of law in a Savignyan 
tradition, which seeks the “seat” of a legal relationship on the basis of an 
international community of states.212 
Finally, the European paradigm is apolitical. Matters of private liti-
gation are considered apolitical; the state’s only task is to provide a 
forum. The right of access to court flows from the plaintiff’s private right 
against the defendant.213 The defendant’s freedom from state intervention 
is irrelevant because the suit is considered a private matter. As a conse-
quence, political theory is rarely used to justify jurisdiction; the relation 
between the court and the defendant is not generally emphasized.214 Po-
litical theory could appear relevant in the form of international relations 
theory, but it is largely absent from European debates.215 The reason is 
that although the focus of jurisdiction is international, its goal is the cor-
rect adjudication of relations between the parties, where state interests 
are thought to be largely absent.216 Just as private law is considered less 
                                                                                                                      
RICO. See Case C-131/03, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc. v. Commission, 2006 WL 
2593840, Celex No. 603J0131 (Sept. 12, 2006); for the U.S. side of the litigation, see Euro-
pean Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1045 (2006). 
 211. While the Brussels Convention was an international treaty, the Brussels Regulation 
is a legislative instrument of the European Community. 
 212. For the seat principle, see Ralf Michaels, Globalizing Savigny? The State in Savi-
gny’s Private International Law and the Challenge of Europeanization and Globalization, in 
Dezentralisierung. Aktuelle Fragen politischer und rechtlicher Steuerung im 
Kontext der Globalisierung (Michael Stolleis & Wolfgang Streeck eds., forthcoming 
2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228. 
 213. But see John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process 
and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 Yale L.J. 524 (2005). 
 214. For exceptions, see supra note 168. 
 215. For a comparative analysis using international relations theory, see Samuel P. 
Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 1297 (2004). 
 216. This may explain why parties can waive the defense of lack of in personam jurisdic-
tion under Brussels I (Art. 24), unlike lack of subject matter jurisdiction under U.S. law 
(Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1244 (2006)). 
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political in Europe than in the United States,217 so adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion in private law matters is considered apolitical. The goal is to achieve 
the most appropriate forum and to protect the defendant against the 
plaintiff, but justifications are usually framed in terms of justice or gen-
eral interest analysis, not politics. This may strike some as naïve. 
Obviously, the decision to treat the law of jurisdiction as a private law 
matter and thereby separate it from political discourse is itself a politi-
cally relevant decision. However, although this decision may well be 
political, allocation itself is not made on the basis of political considera-
tions, but rather in an apolitical manner. 
3. Subsumption and Externalization of Competing Considerations 
An obvious objection to the analysis so far mirrors the objection to 
the analysis of U.S. jurisdiction above. There, the question was whether 
one could really say that U.S. law of jurisdiction does not deal with 
allocational concerns in a multilateral fashion. Here, the question is 
whether one can really say that European law of jurisdiction ignores 
vertical relations between the court and the defendant. The answer also 
mirrors the answer given above: such considerations are important in 
Europe (though maybe less so than multilateral considerations are 
relevant in American thought), but they are either subsumed into a 
horizontal approach or externalized to other institutions. 
First, subsumption: common law practitioners sometimes argue that 
the common law cares more about justice for the parties, while the civil 
law cares more about relations between states.218 In part, this reading is 
compatible with the paradigmatic difference developed in this Article. 
The civil law, as embodied in European thinking about jurisdiction, is 
international in the sense that it emphasizes relations between countries. 
The common law, as embodied particularly in U.S. thinking about juris-
diction, is vertical in the sense that it emphasizes individual rights. This 
reading is flawed, however, if it insinuates that only the common law 
cares about justice for the parties.219 The truth is more complex: both 
paradigms prize justice, but they do so in different ways. Contrary to 
                                                                                                                                 
 217. Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, 
Globalization, Privatization Europeanization, Globalization, Privatization, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 
(forthcoming 2007). 
 218. Peter B. Carter, Anti-Suit Injunctions in Private International Law, 368 Vorträge, 
Reden und Berichte aus dem Europa-Institut Sektion Rechtswissenschaft 13 (1997), 
available at http://europainstitut.de/euin/schrift/download/368.pdf; Hartley, supra note 23, at 
814–15; Trevor C. Hartley, How to Abuse the System and (Maybe) Come Out on Top: Bad-Faith 
Proceedings Under the Brussels Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention, in Law and Justice in 
a Multistate World—Essays in Honor of Arthur T. von Mehren, supra note 46, at 81. 
 219. It is equally flawed if it insinuates that only the civil law cares about relations with 
other states or countries; see supra Part III.A.3. 
MICHAELS FTP3.DOC 1/2/2007 11:15 AM 
Summer 2006] Two Paradigms of Jurisdiction 1049 
frequent misperceptions, fairness is by no means unimportant in 
European jurisdictional thought. While in U.S. law, the protection of de-
fendants is usually not addressed as a problem in their relation to the 
court,220 in Europe this protection is subsumed within the horizontal 
debate on proper allocation of jurisdiction. The defendant is protected 
not against the court exercising jurisdiction but against the plaintiff who 
chooses that court—a subtle but important distinction.  
Fairness plays out in formal and substantive ways. Formally, Euro-
peans would question the asserted discrepancy between justice and 
consistency.221 To them, the predictability achieved by the Brussels rules 
is itself an important element of fairness to the parties.222 Substantively, 
Europeans would argue that the rules of the Brussels Regulation are 
based on justice considerations. The priority given to jurisdiction in the 
defendant’s home country is justified with the defendant’s interest in 
being sued at home except under certain conditions. One may deem this 
protection ineffective (because in fact the plaintiff can frequently sue at 
another forum of her choice)223 or misplaced (because it does not account 
sufficiently for the interests of the plaintiff),224 but one cannot claim that 
European law of jurisdiction does not address the interests of defendants. 
The rules of the Brussels Regulation serve not only to establish de-
tailed rules of allocation of jurisdiction, but also to fulfill the quasi-
constitutional function of restricting jurisdiction in order to protect de-
fendants’ due process rights.225 First, such protection is accomplished 
through Article 3, which ensures that domiciliaries of the European Un-
ion can only be sued in a court designated by the rules of the Brussels 
Regulation. Although this protection is not extended to defendants domi-
ciled in other countries,226 the ECJ has made clear that the protection 
applies also against plaintiffs from non-member states.227 Second, the 
Court has held repeatedly that Article 2, which gives general jurisdiction 
to the defendant’s domicile, serves as a general principle for the interpre-
                                                                                                                                 
 220. Due process does enter the analysis as a restriction with regard to specific bases of 
international jurisdiction; for Article 23 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, see von Me-
hren, supra note 10, at 174–77; Kleinstück, supra note 168, at 166–88. 
 221. Supra note 23. 
 222. Case C-26/91, Handte & Co. v. Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces S.A., 
1992 E.C.R. I-3967, para. 15; Schack, supra note 166, at 94, no. 203; Kropholler, supra 
note 190, before art. 2, no. 20, at 101; Gardella & Radicati di Brozolo, supra note 185, at 614. 
 223. von Mehren, supra note 10, at 192. 
 224. The plaintiff’s interests are externalized to the right of access to court; see infra, 
Part IV.A. 
 225. See Michaels, supra note 59, at 153–54. 
 226. Brussels I, supra note 18, art. 4(1); for discussion, see infra Part IV.B.  
 227. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000 
E.C.R. I-5925; Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Sept. 28, 2005, XII ZR 
17/03 (II.1.b) (F.R.G.). See also 20 NJW-Rechtsprechungsreport (NJW-RR) 1593 (2005). 
MICHAELS FTP3.DOC 1/2/2007 11:15 AM 
1050 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 27:1003 
tation of other provisions of the Brussels Regulation, so specific bases of 
jurisdiction must be construed narrowly.228 This is intended to protect 
defendants. Third, each of the provisions on specific jurisdiction is justi-
fied by the close connection between the dispute and the court called 
upon for its resolution.229 This serves the double function of ensuring that 
only one of the member states has specific jurisdiction for a certain cate-
gory (e.g., contract) and that the defendant is not sued in an inconvenient 
forum.230 Fourth, the Court is willing to restrict the application of certain 
problematic provisions. For example, it restricts the jurisdiction of Brus-
sels I Article 6(2) for third-party proceedings to cases in which there is a 
“a sufficient connection between the original proceedings and the third 
party proceedings to support the conclusion that the choice of forum 
does not amount to an abuse.”231 While these words are reminiscent of 
the minimum contacts test developed under the Due Process Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution,232 the source for the ECJ is not Article 6(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the European provision on due 
process, but rather the Brussels Regulation itself.233 
Some critics argue that the Brussels Regulation performs the func-
tion of restricting jurisdiction for the protection of defendants 
inadequately,234 just as the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
performs the function of accounting for federal interests inadequately.235 
First, the text of the Regulation cannot easily be adapted in individual 
                                                                                                                                 
 228. See, e.g., Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, paras. 12–14; 
Case C-26/91, Handte & Co. v. Traitements Mécano-chimiques des Surfaces S.A., 1992 
E.C.R. I-3967, para. 14; Case 32/88, Six Constructions v. Humbert, 1989 E.C.R. 341, para. 
18; Case 189/87, Kalfelis v. Bankhaus Schröder, Münchmeyer, Hengst & Co., 1988 E.C.R. 
5565, para. 19. 
 229. Jenard Report, supra note 189, at 22; Case 21/76, Bier v. Mines de Potasse, 1976 
E.C.R. 1735, paras. 10–11; Case 56/79, Zelger v. Salinitri, 1980 E.C.R. 89, para. 3; Case C-
220/88, Dumez France v. Hessische Landesbank, 1990 E.C.R. I-49, para. 17; Case C-68/93, 
Fiona Shevill v. Presse Alliance, 1995 E.C.R. I-415, para. 19; Réunion Européenne v. Spliet-
hoff’s Bevrachtingskantoor, 1998 E.C.R. I-6513, para. 27; Case C-256/00, Besix v. WABAG, 
2002 E.C.R. I-1699, paras. 30–31; Case C-37/00, Weber v. Ogden Universal Services, 2002 
E.C.R. I-2013, para. 39; Case C-168/02, Kronhofer v. Maier, 2004 E.C.R. I-6009, para. 15. 
 230. For jurisdiction in contracts and torts, see the analysis in Michaels, supra note 59, 
at 151–54; cf. Horatia Muir Watt, Book Review, 94 Revue critique de droit interna-
tional privé 865, 867–68 (2005) (“enlightening distinction”). 
 231. Case C-77/04, GIE Réunion Européenne v. Zurich España, Soptrans., 2005 E.C.R. 
I-4509, para. 36 (concerning Brussels Art. 6(2), dealing with third party claims. Art. 6(2) 
would be problematic under U.S. constitutional law after the decision in Asahi, 480 U.S. 102).  
 232. Note, however, that a sufficient connection must exist to the main proceedings, not 
to the court. 
 233. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 234. See Peter Schlosser, Jurisdiction in International Litigation—The Issue of Human 
Rights in Relation to National Law and to the Brussels Convention, 74 Rivista di Diritto 
Internazionale 5 (1991). 
 235. Supra Part III.A.3. 
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cases; the ECJ has repeatedly rejected flexible interpretation of its provi-
sions.236 Second, some applications remain problematic. For example, the 
possibility that Brussels I Article 5(3) gives jurisdiction in product liabil-
ity cases to the place of the accident even if that place was unpredictable 
for the defendant would arguably amount to a violation of due process.237 
As with allocational concerns in the United States,238 scholars draw op-
posite conclusions. One is to base restrictions of jurisdiction on texts 
outside the Regulation, especially the European Convention on Human 
Rights.239 The other is to ignore such considerations altogether. 
Yet, the need to consider due process issues is less urgent once we 
account for the ways in which defendant protection is externalized out of 
the law of jurisdiction altogether. The most important such mechanism is 
choice of law. In the United States, adjudicatory jurisdiction is in a ma-
jority of cases similar to legislative jurisdiction,240 and if a court finds 
that it has jurisdiction, it will frequently apply its own law.241 This is true 
in particular for international cases in federal courts, where a court’s sub-
ject matter jurisdiction depends on the applicability of U.S. federal law 
rather than foreign law.242 But even in cases in which foreign law could 
be applied, such application is relatively rare. In domestic courts and 
interstate cases, the U.S. Supreme Court has traditionally confined con-
stitutional constraints regarding choice of law to a minimum.243 American 
scholars have criticized this discrepancy. Linda Silberman famously 
quipped, “To believe that a defendant’s contacts with the forum should 
be stronger under the Due Process Clause for jurisdictional purposes 
than for choice of law is to believe that an accused is more concerned 
with where he will be hanged than whether.”244 Yet presumably, the ac-
cused cares neither where he will be hanged (personal jurisdiction), nor 
according to whose laws (choice of law); he simply hopes that either 
                                                                                                                                 
 236. See Jacco Bomhoff, Judicial Discretion in European Law on Conflicts of 
Jurisdiction 31–34 (2005). 
 237. Schlosser, supra note 17, at 34–36. 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 132, 146–48. 
 239. See Guinchard, supra note 66; Grolimund, supra note 66, at 108–14; Nuyts, supra 
note 50, at 55–56; Schlosser, supra note 17, at 11–12.  
 240. See Weintraub, supra note 14, at 120–22. 
 241. Scoles et al., supra note 9, at 167. 
 242. The relationship between subject matter jurisdiction and prescriptive jurisdiction is 
still unclear. See United Phosphorus, Ltd. v. Angus Chem. Co., 322 F.3d 942 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(en banc).  
 243. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The U.S. Supreme Court 
seemed to suggest otherwise in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, recognizing that “[t]he issue 
of personal jurisdiction . . . is entirely distinct from the question of the constitutional limita-
tions on choice of law.” 472 U.S. 797, 821 (1985). But its next decision in the same case 
proved this to be largely lip service. See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988).  
 244. Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 33, 
88 (1978).  
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jurisdiction or choice of law lead to a favorable result. In this sense, re-
strictions on jurisdiction and restrictions on choice of law can act as 
functional equivalents; a legal order can use one or the other for the 
same purpose.245 While U.S. law has focused on the former and neglected 
the latter, European law has concentrated on the latter while neglecting 
the former. Some areas of choice of law have been unified (most impor-
tantly contract law)246 or are about to be (most importantly tort law).247 
But even in areas that are not unified, European choice of law has tradi-
tionally preferred potentially universal rules over rules that favor forum 
law.248 As a consequence, parties are protected from courts applying 
home law against them better than in the United States. One explicit pol-
icy behind such universal rules is the desire to reduce the incentive for 
forum shopping. If the applicable law is the same no matter which forum 
the plaintiff chooses, then forum shopping has less impact on the out-
come of cases. In fact, one important impetus for the unification of 
choice of law rules for contractual obligations lay in the law of jurisdic-
tion, in particular Article 5(1) of the Brussels Regulation, which gives 
jurisdiction to the place of performance. Now that choice of law for con-
tracts has been unified, courts all over the Eurpoean Union must apply 
the same law to determine the place of performance and should, there-
fore, find the same courts to have jurisdiction under Article 5(1). 
IV. Some Practical Consequences of the  
Paradigmatic Difference 
The paradigmatic difference is plausible in theory. But does it matter 
in practice, especially since paradigms do not determine outcomes? The 
                                                                                                                                 
 245. See Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdic-
tion and Choice of Law, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 249 (1991) (suggesting the use of choice of law 
criteria for adjudicatory jurisdiction).  
 246. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Consoli-
dated Version), 1998 O.J. (C 27) 34 (EC); Proposal for a European Parliament and Council 
Regulation on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, COM (2005) 650 final (Dec. 
15, 2005) [hereinafter Rome I]. The Convention will likely be turned into a Community in-
strument. 
 247. Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations, COM (2006) 83 final (Feb. 21, 2006) [hereinafter 
Rome II]; for the most recent version, see Council Common Position (EC), Interinstitutional 
File 2003/0168 (COD), available at http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/06/st09/ 
st09751-re07ad01.en06.pdf. 
 248. See Mathias Reimann, Conflict of Laws in Western Europe: A Guide 
Through the Jungle 105–09 (1994). But see, for a concealed European trend towards ap-
plying forum law, Th. M. de Boer, Forum Preferences in Contemporary European Conflicts 
Law: The Myth of a “Neutral Choice”, in 1 Festschrift für Erik Jayme 39 (Heinz-Peter 
Mansel et al. eds., 2004). 
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answer is a clear yes: the difference matters a great deal. While para-
digms do not determine outcomes, they shape the discourse that leads to 
outcomes. This can be observed in the comparison of U.S. and European 
jurisdictional law. The difference can explain why Americans and Euro-
peans, when talking about issues of jurisdiction, talk past each other. It 
can account for the style of arguments on each side in negotiations, for 
conflicting views on specific issues, and for different views within what 
look like apparent similarities. 
A. The Role of Due Process 
The paradigmatic difference can both highlight and account for dif-
ferences that go almost unnoted in the literature. One of these is the fact 
that due process actually does play a role in European jurisdictional 
thought, but its role is directly opposite to that played in the United 
States. While the Due Process Clause in the United States protects the 
defendant against the unjustified assertion of jurisdiction, the fair trial 
principle in European law protects the plaintiff against the unjustified 
denial of jurisdiction.249 This is achieved through the doctrine of right of 
access to court, protected under ECHR Article 6(1)250 and the European 
Charter of Fundamental Rights,251 as well as national constitutional pro-
visions like Article 101(1) of the German Basic Law.  
This shows that the relevant difference between European and 
American jurisdictional law is not that European law is not constitution-
alized. Each system is constitutionalized, but only in one regard: 
whereas Europe hardly protects defendants under its due process test 
(although it could),252 U.S. law does not endorse an explicit general right 
of access to court.253 Such a right can be found only indirectly in two 
other doctrines. The first is jurisdiction by necessity, the idea that a court 
has exceptional jurisdiction if justice so demands, even absent the usual 
                                                                                                                                 
 249. Peter D. Trooboff, Ten (and Probably More) Difficulties in Negotiating a Worldwide 
Convention on International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments: Some Initial Les-
sons, in A Global Law of Jurisdiction: Lessons From the Hague 263, 271–72 (John J. 
Barceló III & Kevin M. Clermont eds., 2002). 
 250. Golder v. United Kingdom, App. No. 4451/70, 1 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 524, para. 36 
(1979); Airey v. Ireland (No. 1), App. No. 6289/73, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 305 (1979); 
Grolimund, supra note 66, at 94–95. 
 251. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 47, Dec. 7, 2000, O.J. (C 
364) 1, 40 I.L.M. 266 (2001), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en. 
pdf. 
 252. Supra Part II.B.1. 
 253. The desire of a state to grant an effective forum can, however, be a relevant criterion 
regarding constitutionality of exercising jurisdiction. See McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 
U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
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requirements, because no other forum is available to the plaintiff.254 This 
idea has occasionally been used to rationalize court decisions255 but is 
usually either confined to a minimum256 or rejected out of hand as an in-
dependent basis for jurisdiction.257 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
suggested such a basis might be possible,258 but has never endorsed it. 
The second doctrine is the duty of courts to exercise the jurisdiction they 
have been given by the legislature, which is sometimes used as an argu-
ment against forum non conveniens.259 Notably, this duty exists between 
the court and the legislature; the benefit to the plaintiff is merely inciden-
tal. In Europe, by contrast, the plaintiff has an explicit right of access to 
court. 
To understand this striking contrast, it is first necessary to place it in 
context. It is not the case that Americans care more about defendants 
while Europeans care more about plaintiffs. If anything, the opposite is 
true. As one expert has put it, with some overstatement, “American 
courts are the plaintiff’s heaven. In contrast, the European courts, par-
ticularly the German courts, are the defendant’s heaven.”260 That the U.S. 
Constitution protects defendants while European constitutional law pro-
tects plaintiffs is not meant to create an imbalance but rather to counter 
an imbalance that would otherwise exist. Without restrictions, U.S. law 
of jurisdiction would be extremely plaintiff-friendly, and European law 
would be extremely defendant-friendly.  
However, this insight only shifts the question; we still need to know 
why these respective imbalances exist. The paradigmatic difference, 
combined with a historical picture, provides an explanation that can be 
sketched as follows. In a world with relatively few transnational transac-
tions, where each party and each transaction could clearly be placed in 
one and only one state, the paradigmatic difference would not matter: 
                                                                                                                                 
 254. Tracy L. Troutman, Note, Jurisdiction by Necessity: Examining One Proposal for 
Unbarring the Doors of our Courts, 21 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 401 (1988); Scoles et al., 
supra note 9, at 348–50. 
 255. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); see George B. 
Fraser, Jurisdiction by Necessity—An Analysis of the Mullane Case, 100 U. Pa. L. Rev. 305 
(1951); Martin H. Redish & Eric J. Beste, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global Resolution of 
Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 917, 
936–37 (1995). 
 256. von Mehren, supra note 100, at 322; Troutman, supra note 254; Scoles et al., 
supra note 9, at 350. 
 257. Brilmayer, supra note 117, at 108–10; Stanley E. Cox, Symposium, Case Four: 
Choice of Law Theory, 20 New Eng. L. Rev. 684, 685 n.2 (1995). 
 258. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985); Helicopteros Nacion-
ales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 418 n.13 (1984); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 211 n.37 (1977). 
 259. For the similar argument in German law, see Schack, supra note 202, at 194.  
 260. See Schlosser, supra note 17, at 37. 
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both a domestic and an international paradigm would always lead to ex-
actly one state having jurisdiction. The rise in international transactions 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries upset this parallelism between 
the domestic and the international paradigms, since it had opposite ef-
fects on each paradigm. For the U.S. paradigm, with its unilateral and 
vertical focus, it led to ever more courts with jurisdiction, since more 
courts had a certain degree of contact with the parties or the transac-
tions.261 The legal system reacted by restricting the number of available 
fora by providing for protection of defendants based on fairness. The 
effect on the multilateral European paradigm was exactly the opposite. 
Here, potential defendants were able to play the system and make sure 
the closest connection, which alone gives jurisdiction, existed to a court 
in which effective protection of plaintiffs was not possible. The legal 
system reacted by providing a right to effective judicial protection. The 
paradigmatic difference does not lead, therefore, to a necessary differ-
ence in the respective protection of plaintiffs and defendants. In effect, it 
may or may not be the case that plaintiffs and defendants are both pro-
tected to the same degree in the U.S. and in Europe. But the way in 
which this balance is achieved is very different. 
B. Natural Forum and Discrimination Against  
Third Country Domiciliaries 
Another issue onto which the paradigmatic difference sheds light is 
the discrimination between domestic and foreign parties. Both U.S. and 
European laws of jurisdiction discriminate against foreigners, but they 
do so in different ways. While European law distinguishes between do-
mestic and foreign defendants in the application of the Brussels regime, 
U.S. law distinguishes between domestic and foreign plaintiffs in the 
application of forum non conveniens. The existence of both these forms 
of discrimination can be explained with the paradigmatic difference: 
what seems almost shockingly unjust within one paradigm is perfectly 
normal in another. 
U.S. law does not discriminate against foreign defendants; the Due 
Process Clause protects both U.S. and foreign citizens and  
domiciliaries.262 Europe, by contrast, distinguishes between European 
and foreign defendants: the Brussels Regulation protects European de-
fendants against the expansive bases of jurisdiction still existing under 
member state laws, but this protection does not extend to non-EU resi-
dents, against whom the exorbitant national bases of jurisdiction can still 
                                                                                                                                 
 261. See Michaels, supra note 12, at 53. 
 262. See Troutman, supra note 254. 
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be used.263 Although such judgments rest on jurisdictional bases explic-
itly condemned by the Brussels Regulation, these judgments are still 
entitled to automatic recognition within the European Union; other 
member states cannot even invoke a public policy exception against 
these bases.264 Whereas Americans have been extremely critical of this 
discrimination,265 only some Europeans concur with the criticism;266 more 
often they do not see anything wrong with the distinction.267 
The situation is reversed with regard to foreign plaintiffs. Here it is 
European law that draws no distinction between domestic and foreign 
plaintiffs.268 U.S. law, by contrast, explicitly distinguishes between for-
eign and domestic plaintiffs,269 to some limited extent in the law of 
jurisdiction,270 but more importantly in the application of forum non con-
veniens, where the plaintiff’s domicile is a decisive factor in determining 
the relative appropriateness of the U.S. forum.271 Europeans view this as 
blatant and unjustified protectionism,272 while many Americans see noth-
ing wrong in closing their courts to what they perceive as forum 
shopping by foreigners. 
Why do Europeans condone discrimination against foreign defen-
dants, while Americans have no problem with discriminating against 
foreign plaintiffs? One important explanation is that Europeans consider 
the defendant’s domicile the natural forum and another forum chosen by 
the plaintiff as the exception,273 while Americans think of the plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                                 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 194–201. 
 264. See Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski, 2000 E.C.R. I-1935; Brussels I, supra 
note 18, art. 35(3). 
 265. See, especially, von Mehren, supra note 196, at 1058–59 (1981) (directly juxtapos-
ing the nondiscriminatory due process clause in the United States and the discriminatory 
provision in Article 3 of the Brussels I regime); for further references, see supra note 196. 
 266. Supra note 194. 
 267. Hélène Gaudemet-Tallon, Les frontières extérieures de l’espace judiciaire euro-
péen: quelques repères, in E Pluribus Unum—Liber Amicorum Georges A.L. Droz 85, 
85–87 (Alegría Borrás et al. eds., 1996). See Grolimund, supra note 199, at 218 (suggesting 
that the discrimination against foreigners as such creates no problems; only the exorbitant 
character of the national bases of jurisdiction applied against them is potentially problematic). 
 268. Case C-412/98, Group Josi Reinsurance Co. SA v. Universal Gen. Ins. Co., 2000 
E.C.R. I-5925. See also Schlosser, supra note 17, at 24 (“a fundamental human judicial 
right”). 
 269. This question is distinct from the more general question of whether foreign plain-
tiffs fare better or worse generally than domestic plaintiffs. For the most recent empirical 
studies suggesting that they fare equally well, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Xenophilia or Xenophobia in American Courts? Before and After 9/11, (Cornell Law Sch. 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, 06-018, Aug. 08, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=923595. 
 270. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 271. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255–56 (1981). 
 272. Schack, supra note 166, at 220, no. 496. 
 273. Supra note 228. 
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domicile as the natural forum, which is unacceptable only when jurisdic-
tion there would violate the defendant’s due process rights. But this 
answer immediately creates a new question: why do Americans and 
Europeans differ on what is the natural forum?  
Again, the paradigmatic difference provides a clue. As regards U.S. 
law, recall that the U.S. paradigm is political. Jurisdiction over defen-
dants must be justified in political terms, especially if those defendants 
are not part of the community that asserts jurisdiction. On the flipside of 
this argument, courts have a political responsibility to provide protection 
for their own citizens’ rights, and therefore to open their courts to them, 
even where they would not open them to others. U.S. courts frequently 
invoke this notion of a political relationship between courts and their 
domiciliaries. 
Notably, such invocations are absent from European decisions on ju-
risdiction. Here, discrimination against foreign defendants is not seen as 
a problem simply because jurisdiction is viewed as apolitical. The origi-
nal reason for the discrimination was merely one of limited competence 
in the European Union: since the goal was unification of laws within the 
common market, third country domiciliaries were simply not at stake.274 
The Brussels Convention did not go beyond what seemed necessary for 
the common market. The international relationship to other countries 
that defined the paradigm was simply different vis-à-vis EU member 
states and other States. In the United States, the situation would be the 
same if the constitutional law of jurisdiction were based on the Full Faith 
and Credit Clause rather than the Due Process Clause, because full faith 
and credit would also limit jurisdiction only vis-à-vis sister states, not 
vis-à-vis foreign nations.275 Currently, calls in Europe to abolish the dis-
crimination against foreign defendants are growing louder,276 a sign that 
this discrimination is now viewed as a mere accident. 
C. State Boundaries and Extraterritoriality 
The paradigmatic difference not only explains manifest differences, 
but also reveals that some apparent similarities rest on misunderstanding. 
One such apparent similarity is the prominence of territorial connections 
and state boundaries within each paradigm.277 Territoriality is still central 
to jurisdictional thinking in both the United States and Europe. In the 
United States, the territorial focus has survived the shift in theories in 
                                                                                                                                 
 274. Supra text accompanying notes 197–198. 
 275. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912) (regarding enforce-
ment of foreign nation judgments). 
 276. Supra note 199. 
 277. See Ralf Michaels, Territorial Jurisdiction After Territoriality, in Globalisation 
and Jurisdiction 105, 107–13 (Piet-Jan Slot & Mielle Bulterman eds., 2004). 
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U.S. jurisdictional law.278 For example, the move from service of process 
in Pennoyer to minimum contacts in International Shoe as a requirement 
for jurisdiction did not change the fact that jurisdiction is still about state 
borders, and minimum contacts are contacts to a territory.279 Similarly, 
jurisdiction in Europe is still largely about places:280 the most important 
connecting factors—the defendant’s residence, the place of the tort, and 
the place of performance—are all territorial. Extraterritorial jurisdiction 
is rejected by both legal systems (at least in principle) and requires spe-
cial justification.281  
Yet, in accordance with their respective paradigms, Americans and 
Europeans understand extraterritoriality to mean different things. Al-
though territoriality and state boundaries are central to both U.S. and 
European thinking about jurisdiction, they play different roles in each 
paradigm. In the domestic U.S. paradigm, the role of boundaries is one 
of delimitation. The power of a court goes to the state’s boundaries, not 
beyond them. It is fair to force a defendant into a court in the state with 
minimum contacts, but not beyond its boundaries. This delimiting func-
tion protects the jurisdiction of other states, but the interference with 
other states’ interests is not in itself a limit on jurisdiction (as it would be 
if it were based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause); it is merely inci-
dental to protecting the defendant.282 By contrast, the role of state 
boundaries in the international European paradigm is one of allocation: 
the locus of an event or a party defines the place that has jurisdiction in a 
multilateral fashion. The problem with extraterritorial jurisdiction is that 
it interferes with another state’s jurisdiction, not that it exceeds the fo-
rum state’s power over the defendant, because the power aspect of 
jurisdiction is not emphasized in the first place. Here, the protection of 
the defendant against the court is merely incidental to this allocational 
function.283 
These differences may appear subtle, but they become relevant in 
real cases. Europeans frequently accuse U.S. courts of judicial hegemo-
nialism, because U.S. courts assert jurisdiction without regard to other 
countries.284 This is clearly a criticism reflecting an international para-
                                                                                                                                 
 278. For a more general history of the importance of territoriality in U.S. law and foreign 
relations, see Kal Raustiala, The Evolution of Territoriality: International Relations and 
American Law, in Territoriality and Conflict in an Era of Globalization 219 (Miles 
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 279. Weinstein, supra note 78, at 210; see also Burnham v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 495 U.S. 
604, 609–10 (1990). 
 280. Michaels, supra note 59, at 129. 
 281. Michaels, supra note 12, at 51.  
 282. Supra Part III.C.1. 
 283. Supra Part III.B.3.  
 284. Supra note 12. 
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digm, in which the vertical relationship of equality between different 
states is prime. Within a vertical and domestic paradigm, these relations 
are secondary to the relationship between court and the parties285—
hegemonialism is at best incidental to, but certainly not a goal of U.S. 
assertions of jurisdiction. By contrast, where Americans criticize certain 
European bases of extraterritorial jurisdiction, they do so with a view to 
the interests of defendants. Exorbitant bases of jurisdiction are criticized 
not because they violate the interests of other countries, but because they 
violate the interests of defendants.286 This reflects a horizontal paradigm. 
Sometimes, this clash in perspective is visible in one case. European 
protests against U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction, based on 
international concerns, frequently meet the response that such assertion 
is necessary for the protection of rights, based on domestic concerns.287 
How the paradigmatic difference plays out in practice can be seen best in 
a rereading of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hartford Fire v. 
California,288 which, although it concerns legislative rather than 
adjudicatory jurisdiction, is symptomatic of the paradigmatic difference. 
When U.S. courts asserted jurisdiction over British reinsurers based on 
the effects of their conduct on the U.S. market, Europeans protested 
against what they perceived as unjustified extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The arguments by Europeans and the Court revealed the paradigmatic 
difference. Europeans criticized U.S. courts for interfering with their 
sovereign interests by disallowing conduct that was perfectly legal in the 
United Kingdom only because of the effects they had on the U.S. 
market. This protest was based on an international paradigm, focusing 
on the territorial allocation of jurisdiction between different countries. In 
this conflict of competing policies, they argued, Europeans should 
prevail because the defendants and their conduct were located in Europe. 
The response by the majority in the U.S. Supreme Court did not really 
address this criticism at all. Curiously, the Court held there was no true 
conflict:289 since the conduct that was illegal under U.S. law was not 
required under U.K. law, the defendants were not in a true conflict 
situation—they could easily comply with both laws. Obviously, the 
notion of a true conflict was different for the U.S. Supreme Court. The 
U.S. response focused not on the horizontal conflict between countries 
                                                                                                                                 
 285. See also Michaels, supra note 12, at 53. 
 286. See supra notes 20–22. 
 287. See Michaels, supra note 12, at 46–47, 52. 
 288. 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 289. Id. at 799. The dissent addressed international concerns under the rubric of comity. 
See also Andreas Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balance of Interests, and the Exercise of Jurisdiction to 
Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89 Am. J. Int’l L. 42, 50 (1995) 
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(as had the European criticism), but on the conflicting vertical 
obligations of the defendant. Here, no such undue interference existed, 
because the defendants did not face a conflict. For Europeans, the 
conflict was a horizontal one between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. For Americans, the potential conflict could be only a vertical 
one between the requirements set by U.S. law and the conflicting 
requirements set by the defendant’s home country law. 
Another example concerns extraterritorial jurisdiction over places 
within no country’s territory. In Smith v. United States,290 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) inapplicable to 
torts committed in Antarctica because Antarctica was a foreign country 
for purposes of the Act. Obviously, this decision is not made out of an 
international concern about interfering with another country’s 
jurisdiction, because Antarctica has no government.291 As a consequence, 
the plaintiff in Smith was left without an effective forum.292 The same 
argument was made, although ultimately without success, against federal 
court jurisdiction over detainees in Guantánamo Bay.293 Although the 
question was about territorial boundaries,294 no one seriously considered 
the jurisdiction of Cuban courts as an alternative to U.S. court, as one 
would in an international paradigm. 
Although European courts have also looked to international law in 
order to determine the territorial contacts necessary for jurisdiction,295 the 
result in Smith, insofar as it concerns adjudicatory jurisdiction, would be 
unlikely in Europe.296 First, adjudicatory jurisdiction always lies in 
defendants’ home courts, and territorial restrictions in statutes are 
matters for choice of law, not adjudicatory jurisdiction. Second, 
jurisdiction is declined only in view of other available fora;297 if no other 
forum is available, denying jurisdiction would violate the plaintiff’s right 
of access to courts. This argument is consistent with an international 
                                                                                                                                 
 290. 507 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1993); similarly, for the Fair Labor Standards Act, see Smith 
v. Raytheon Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 397, 401–02 (D. Mass. 2004). But see Arnett v. Comm’r, 126 
T.C. 89, 95 (2006) (Antarctica is not a foreign country for purposes of the Tax Code). 
 291. Brilmayer, supra note 116, at 295; Brilmayer, supra note 104, at 271.  
 292. Jonathan Blum, Note, The Deep Freeze: Torts, Choice of Law, and the Antarctic 
Treaty Regime, 8 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 667, 669, 686 (1994). 
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 297. Supra text accompanying notes 205–06.  
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paradigm, in which the limits of the forum state’s sovereignty as such 
play a lesser role,298 while allocational issues matter more. 
D. Forum non conveniens, Lis alibi pendens,  
and Parallel Proceedings 
The paradigmatic difference can also serve to explain the difference 
in American and European attitudes towards specific doctrines, notably 
forum non conveniens, lis alibi pendens, and antisuit injunctions. Forum 
non conveniens, by now an important doctrine of U.S. law, is rejected in 
Europe. The European Court of Justice has refused to allow U.K. courts 
to apply the doctrine in cases without connections to any member 
states.299 Many explain this difference by pointing out that Europeans 
favor consistency and predictability over justice in individual cases, 
whereas Americans focus more on justice in individual cases and less on 
predictability and consistency.300 It is true that predictability played an 
important role when the ECJ rejected forum non conveniens in the 
Brussels Regulation.301 But U.S. courts emphasize formalism in applying 
rules in other areas of the law, while Europeans grant discretion to their 
courts.302 The difference regarding forum non conveniens must be ex-
plained otherwise. 
Here again, the paradigmatic difference is helpful. The comparison 
to this point has made clear that, in U.S. law, forum non conveniens 
serves two purposes not covered appropriately by the Due Process 
Clause. The first is the function of judicial “fine tuning”303—the devel-
opment of specific rules for the individual case. The second is the 
function of “jurisdictional equilibration”304—the horizontal, international 
allocation of jurisdiction in view of other countries’ positions. In Europe, 
where both these functions are served by the normal jurisdiction provi-
sions, forum non conveniens would add little in this respect. Europeans 
point out that the need for forum non conveniens is reduced with 
increased specificity and quality of rules on jurisdiction:305 “fine tuning” 
is unnecessary if jurisdictional rules are already finely tuned. More 
generally, the rules on jurisdiction contained in regimes like the Brussels 
                                                                                                                                 
 298. Michaels, supra note 59, at 136. 
 299. Case C-281/02, Owusu v. Jackson, 2005 E.C.R. I-1383. 
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Regulation are thought to typify the considerations relevant in a forum 
non conveniens analysis.306 This is true also for the multilateral 
considerations that due process cannot encompass adequately, but that 
European law fulfills with other means.307 In other words, Europeans do 
not think that a system of horizontally-based jurisdiction needs to be 
supplemented by a horizontal institution like forum non conveniens to 
provide a missing element. 
The reciprocal is true for lis alibi pendens. Americans do not think 
that vertical notions of jurisdiction imply the supremacy (or exclusivity) 
of one proceeding over others that may be brought. Regarding the treat-
ment of parallel proceedings between U.S. law and European law, two 
differences are notable. First, European law tries to avoid parallel pro-
ceedings from the beginning through rules on lis alibi pendens. If 
another court is already seized with an affair, the second court seized 
must decline jurisdiction.308 European law allows courts to decline juris-
diction by discretion in favor of proceedings before another court only 
for related actions.309 U.S. law, by contrast, has a similarly strict rule only 
for the recognition stage: the first decision rendered becomes binding on 
other courts.310 So European law focuses entirely on a priority of the 
court first seized,311 while U.S. law focuses largely on the priority of the 
judgment rendered. Second, to the extent that U.S. law addresses parallel 
proceedings earlier, it gives the judge three options: stop her own pro-
ceedings in favor of the other court (forum non conveniens), try to stop 
the proceedings in the other court in favor of her own proceedings (anti-
suit injunctions), or do nothing, but there are no mandatory rules. 
Europe, by contrast, opposes antisuit injunctions entirely.312  
It should be obvious how the first of these two differences links with 
the paradigmatic difference. Because European rules on jurisdiction are 
understood to be international and multilateral, one court’s decision 
about its jurisdiction necessarily includes a decision about the potential 
jurisdiction of other courts. It follows that the first court’s decision that it 
has jurisdiction can be given effect against all other courts, since other 
courts could not validly invoke any multilateral factors that are not al-
ready inherent in the provisions applied by the original court. It is a 
misunderstanding, therefore, to complain that in dealing with parallel 
                                                                                                                                 
 306. Kropholler, supra note 204, at 595–96; Schack, supra note 166, at 223, no. 502. 
 307. For a detailed comparison, see Nuyts, supra note 47, at 368–456 (2003). 
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proceedings “the [Brussels] Convention system makes no attempt to de-
cide which of the two courts is more appropriate.”313 Rather, all rules of 
the Brussels Regulation carry the presumption that they assign jurisdic-
tion to courts that are a priori equally appropriate,314 so no further forum 
non conveniens test is necessary. In this sense, lis alibi pendens is the 
formal resolution of a conflict between different courts all deemed simi-
larly appropriate vis-à-vis each other. For U.S. law, on the other hand, it 
makes sense to deal with parallel proceedings only at the recognition 
stage, because until then each court assumes (or denies) its jurisdiction 
regardless of others on a unilateral basis, and thus in relative oblivious-
ness to the situation of other states’ or countries’ courts.  
The paradigmatic difference also does much to explain the differing 
views on antisuit injunctions. Proponents make two arguments to defend 
such injunctions in the context of the Brussels Regulation. First, such 
injunctions are not directed against the other court but against the party; 
as a consequence, the injunctions do not interfere with another court’s 
autonomy.315 Second, antisuit injunctions actually promote the ideals of 
the Brussels Regulation, because they help divest foreign courts from 
exercising jurisdiction that they do not rightfully have.316 
These arguments are telling because they make sense only in the 
American, not in the European paradigm. The first argument—that in-
junctions are directed against the parties rather than foreign courts—
presumes an understanding of jurisdiction in which the relevant relation-
ship is the vertical one between the court and the parties, not the 
horizontal relationship to other courts. At the same time, the argument 
fits a domestic paradigm. Antisuit injunctions help a court maintain liti-
gation within its domestic realm over the obstruction of a party. Whether 
this obstruction takes place through “domestic” contempt of court or by 
bringing suit in a foreign court matters little; in both cases the vertical 
relation between the court and the defendant is all that counts, and 
measures of the court are directed only against the party before it. As 
strong as these arguments are in the U.S. paradigm, they are weak within 
the European paradigm. In a vertical and international paradigm, injunc-
tions undeniably interfere with other courts’ autonomy.317  
The second argument—that injunctions actually support the Brussels 
regime—makes sense in a unilateral system in which each court interprets 
                                                                                                                                 
 313. Hartley, supra note 23, at 816. 
 314. Supra text before note 210. 
 315. Turner v. Grovit, [2000] 1 Q.B. 345, 364 (C.A. 1999). 
 316. See Hartley, supra note 23. 
 317. Some common law lawyers concede this; see, e.g., Fentiman, supra note 25, at 124; 
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jurisdictional rules in isolation from others, and in which multilateral con-
siderations must be contributed through other means. In the multilateral 
European paradigm, this argument must fail. If each court, in deciding 
whether it has jurisdiction, must make its decision multilaterally, then it 
must also consider all the vertical arguments in view of the claims of other 
courts to jurisdiction, and no court should restrain another court from 
making this decision autonomously. The question both courts face is the 
same and neither of them is hierarchically superior to the other.318 
E. The Style of the Hague Negotiations 
Finally, we return to the Hague negotiations. Different paradigmatic 
positions help explain some under-appreciated features of the negotiation 
process. First, they help expose a startling difference in perception of 
what the negotiations were about.319 For the U.S. side, the negotiations 
represented a matter of bargaining over power positions, while Europe-
ans considered the negotiation as a common attempt to find the best 
rules for a quasi-codification. In the United States, various academic ar-
ticles described the negotiations as a matter of trade or bargain.320 Of 
course, Europeans also acted strategically, maintaining both the applica-
bility of exorbitant bases of jurisdiction against third states321 and the 
reciprocity requirement for recognizing foreign judgments322 in order to 
improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the United States.323 Such 
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strategies notwithstanding, the ideal end result for Europeans closer re-
sembled a codification of best jurisdictional practices than a treaty. This 
preference for codification may explain the remarkable lack of interest 
among European academics and practitioners in the negotiations, com-
pared to the intense reactions within the United States. Certainly, the fact 
that a codification of best practices of jurisdiction already existed, 
namely in form of the Brussels Convention,324 made the Hague negotia-
tions look like a relatively technical matter. It also explains why 
Europeans hoped for a broad convention covering many areas of the law. 
In their view, a convention that unified only restricted areas was not 
worth the candle.325 Americans, on the other hand, were happy to agree 
on some matters they thought were favorable to them and leave other 
areas to the unregulated status quo. A codification requires wide-
reaching unification of law; a treaty does not. 
It is not enough to point to the general preference of civil law coun-
tries for codification as the sole explanation for the difference in 
negotiation styles,326 because this preference for codification must be 
explained within the realm of jurisdiction. The difference in attitude is 
better explained with reference to the two paradigms. One obvious ex-
planation lies in the political character of American jurisdictional 
thinking, which lends itself more to the process of give-and-take bar-
gaining than the apolitical European understanding of jurisdiction. 
Another explanation may be counterintuitive at first, but ultimately more 
important: a unilateral paradigm of jurisdiction is more appropriate for 
international unification through negotiations and bargaining.327 If a 
country first determines its own scope of jurisdiction without regard to 
the interests of other countries, it is easier to define a bargaining position 
for negotiations with a view to a rational bargain leading to a mutually 
optimal result.328 By contrast, the multilateral paradigm Europeans en-
dorse does not lend itself so easily to international bargaining. Because 
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Europeans have already adopted potentially universal rules, their interest 
is more in transposing these rules to the global level, as they did by using 
the Brussels Regulation as a model for the Hague. Only the convention-
as-bargain model fits well into the political and unilateral paradigm of 
jurisdiction in the United States, while the convention-as-codification 
model goes better with the European apolitical, multilateral paradigm. 
The paradigmatic difference provides a good explanation for another 
issue. Europeans preferred to unify both the law of recognition and en-
forcement and the law of jurisdiction in a “double convention,” in which 
every imaginable basis of jurisdiction would be either required or pro-
hibited for purposes of jurisdiction and enforcement. By contrast, 
Americans supported a “mixed convention,” which would have included 
agreement on both required and forbidden grounds of jurisdiction, but 
would have retained a third gray zone of bases that are neither required 
nor prohibited, but merely permitted.329 Clearly, such a model works well 
in the framework of a bargain—bases on which agreement cannot be 
reached are left in the gray zone, which represents the state of nature.330 
The mixed convention is much more anathema to the framework of codi-
fication, for which a residual area of state of nature is much more alien. 
This is certainly one important reason why Europeans rejected the model 
until quite recently:331 there was the fear that the gray zone could become 
too large.332 Thus, while it is probably correct to point out that the Hague 
process would have been more promising if the negotiating partners had 
focused on a mixed convention from the beginning,333 adoption of a 
mixed convention model would not have been a neutral step either. It 
would have been an accommodation of the U.S. versus the European 
paradigm of jurisdiction. 
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V. Conclusions 
Both Americans and Europeans discussing jurisdictional issues 
sometimes claim universal applicability for their theories.334 This Article 
has shown the limits to such claims. Jurisdictional regimes in the United 
States and Europe are functionally equivalent insofar as they must deal 
with similar problems, namely the horizontal allocation of jurisdiction 
between states and the vertical protection of parties against courts. Yet 
differences exist not only between the rules, institutions, and theories, 
but also between the paradigms within which each side creates and justi-
fies these rules, institutions, and theories.  
This argument provides responses to the convergence thesis laid out 
in the introduction. All three variants of the convergence thesis are too 
narrowly focused on individual problems and institutions. Paradigms, by 
emphasizing how all such institutions interact with whole legal systems, 
can explain why convergence does not occur. This is true for all three 
variants of the thesis. Even under economic pressure of globalization, 
path dependency provides an answer to why different legal systems 
achieve different institutional solutions that are efficient in their respec-
tive legal systems. Functional equivalence can explain not only how 
different legal systems largely reach the same results by different 
(equivalent) means, but also why, since legal systems differ in the means 
they use to fulfill similar functions, functional equivalence enables dif-
ference rather than similarity.335 Paradigms can show how legal solutions 
are embedded, if not in amorphous and general national cultures, at least 
in general national argumentative patterns that lead to different responses 
to similar problems.  
At the same time, the paradigmatic difference suggests the risks in-
volved in criticizing solutions from another legal system. Since the critic 
argues from a paradigm different from the rules she criticizes, she may 
risk holding an inappropriate standard to that law.  
So, what is to be done? One might be tempted to try and create a 
neutral paradigm transcending the differences by combining the two ex-
isting paradigms. A neutral paradigm would be one that gives equal 
weight to the vertical relation between the court and the parties and the 
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horizontal relation between the courts of different states. Such an idea 
faces serious problems. First, each paradigm already contains a combi-
nation of both horizontal and vertical considerations. The U.S. paradigm 
is vertical, but it accounts for horizontal considerations partly through 
subsumption, partly through externalization. The European paradigm is 
horizontal, but it likewise accounts for vertical considerations through 
subsumption and externalization. That each paradigm accounts for both 
kinds of considerations provides an explanation for why each of them is 
relatively stable. Second, because horizontal and vertical relations are 
incommensurable, it is hard to imagine a paradigm that gives equal 
weight to both without determining what equal weight would actually 
mean. Quite possibly, subsumption and externalization of one of the two 
considerations is a more successful way of achieving such commensura-
bility. 
If anything, the relative stability of each paradigm provides a strong 
caveat against any hope for easy unification. Comparative lawyers often 
claim that unification of laws is made easier by the insight that different 
legal systems fulfill the same functions through different means—the 
idea of functional equivalence.336 Such a hope undoubtedly lay at the 
base of the Hague negotiations. The failure of these negotiations yields 
evidence for the opposite claim: functional equivalence provides strong 
arguments against unification.337 Functional equivalence thus serves, 
ironically, to explain the failure of the Hague negotiations. Precisely be-
cause different legal orders can fulfill the same functions by different 
means, they are not forced to surrender their own means for others if 
those other means are not superior but “equivalent.”338 To adopt the 
functionally equivalent institution of another law does not yield great 
benefits—because that institution will only fulfill the same functions—
while creating great costs.339 And since legal orders function as whole 
entities, unification of individual elements has likely ramifications in 
other parts of the legal system.340 The recent unhappiness in the United 
Kingdom341 over the degree to which the Brussels Regulation interferes 
with areas thought to be separate from jurisdiction—forum non conven-
iens and antisuit injunctions—is both proof of this thesis and a warning 
for unification proposals. 
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If this is so, then unification of jurisdictional law may be possible 
neither within one paradigm nor through a combination of both para-
digms, but only through a common paradigm shift. It is unlikely that 
either Europeans or Americans will adopt the other side’s paradigm. 
More likely is the realization that both paradigms are inadequate. The 
Hague negotiations failed not only because of differences between the 
negotiating parties, but also because new issues arose that posed seem-
ingly insurmountable challenges to all participants: the Internet, 
intellectual property, and human rights litigation. Both Americans and 
Europeans struggle with the difficulties of territorializing the Internet, 
the global proliferation of IP-protected goods, the urgent desire to render 
justice to victims of human rights violations, and the existence of global 
cartels. Neither the American nor the European approach seems able to 
cope properly with the challenges these issues pose, and both fail for 
similar reasons. 
If U.S. and European approaches to jurisdiction are equally unable 
to resolve certain issues, this suggests the problem is not so much a para-
digmatic difference between the two, but rather a common inadequacy. 
Both the domestic and the international paradigms rely on the traditional 
image of sovereignty in what is often referred to as the Westphalian 
model. Sovereignty in this sense has two aspects. One of them, the ex-
clusive power of a state to regulate events within its territory, 
corresponds well with the domestic paradigm of jurisdiction. The other 
aspect, the mutual recognition between sovereign states, corresponds 
with the international paradigm of jurisdiction. If this traditional image 
of sovereignty is inadequate under conditions of globalization, as is fre-
quently claimed, then both paradigms are similarly inadequate as well, 
and both sides must come together to create a new, third paradigm of 
jurisdiction. But this remains a topic for another study. 
